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Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages
Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products
David G. Owent
In early February 1978, the legal and business communities
were stunned when a Santa Ana, California, jury returned a verdict
for $125 million in punitive damages in the case of Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co.' The case involved the design of the first modem
American subcompact car, the Ford Pinto,' and arose from the
t Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. I am indebted to a number of persons
who made helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, especially Lawrence H. Curtis,
John P. Eppel, Richard A. Epstein, William D. Ford, Gary J. Haugen, James A. Henderson,
Jr., Frances S. Owen, Jerry J. Phillips, Hon. Richard A. Posner, Victor E. Schwartz, Aaron
D. Twerski, John W. Wade, and Malcolm E. Wheeler.
I No. 19-77-61 (Super. Ct., Orange Cty., Cal., Feb. 7, 1978), aff'd as amended, 119 Cal.
App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
2 General discussions of the issues in the Pinto civil litigation include Bruck, How Ford
Stalled the Pinto Litigation, Am. Law., June 1979, at 23; Dowie, Pinto Madness, MOTHER
JONES, Sept./Oct. 1977, at 18; Owen, Crashworthiness Litigation and Punitive Damages, 4
J. PRODS. LL B. 221 (1981); Schmitt & May, Beyond Products Liability: The Legal, Social,
and Ethical Problems Facing the Automobile Industry in Producing Safe Products, 56 U.
DET. J. URB. L. 1021 (1979).
For discussions of the criminal litigation involving the Pinto, see L. STOBEL, RECKLESS
Homi.cmE? (1980); Epstein, Is Pinto a Criminal?, REG., Mar./Apr. 1980, at 15; Tybor, How
Ford Won Pinto Trial, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 24, 1980, at 1. See also the series of National Law
Journal articles by Professor Malcolm E. Wheeler on the prospect and implications of fu-
ture criminal trials in the products liability context: In Pinto's Wake, Criminal Trials Loom
for More Manufacturers, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 6, 1980, at 27; The Public's Costly Mistrust of
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death of a driver and severe burns suffered by a young passenger,
Richard Grimshaw, in a Pinto that burst into flames when its gas
tank ruptured upon being struck from the rear by another vehicle.8
The enormous verdict for punitive damages was based on jury
findings that Ford knew of dangers in the fuel system before the
car was placed on the market and, although the company also
knew that it could remedy the problem through inexpensive design
changes, chose instead to sell the car in its dangerous condition to
save on costs.4 The trial court subsequently remitted the punitive
damages verdict to $3.5 million.5 The California Court of Appeal
recently affirmed the verdict as remitted in a lengthy opinion that
characterized Ford's conduct in marketing the Pinto as "reprehen-
sible in the extreme."'
In 1976 1 published in the Michigan Law Review the results of
my study on the use of punitive damages in products liability liti-
gation.1 Although a number of juries already had rendered such
awards,8 there was at that time very scant appellate authority for
punitive awards in this context.9 The largest such judgment ap-
Cost-Benefit Safety Analysis, id., Oct. 13, 1980, at 26 [hereinafter cited as Costly Mistrust];
Cost-Benefit Analysis on Trial: A Case of Delusion and Reality, id., Oct. 20, 1980, at 28;
Manufacturers: Wrong Targets for Threat of Criminal Sanctions?, id., Dec. 22, 1980, at 24;
Enforcing Product Safety: A Maze of Legal Issues and Ramifications, id., Dec. 29, 1980, at
23.
3 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 773-74, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 359
(1981).
4 Id. at 774-78, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359-62. The danger alleged in the fuel system's design
was its particular vulnerability to rupture when hit from the rear at relatively low speeds,
with the resulting risk of fire if escaping fuel ignited. Specific claims of design inadequacy
that allegedly aggravated the situation included the location of the fuel tank within only
nine or ten inches (of "crush space") from the rear bumper, the flimsiness of the bumper
itself, the absence of reinforcing members in the rear frame, and the positioning of the fuel
tank just behind the differential housing with sharp protrusions pointing directly at the
tank. Id. at 774, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360. In addition, read in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, the evidence showed that there were a variety of corrective design changes (so-
called safety "fixes") that were feasible and economical. See id. at 775-76, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
361; note 149 infra.
' Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-77-61 (Super. Ct., Orange Cty., Cal., Mar. 30,
1978) (mem. order), aff'd, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981). Grimshaw was
required to accept the remittitur as a condition of the trial court's denial of Ford's motion
for a new trial. Id. at 4-5.
6 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 819, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388
(1981) (viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment).
7 Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. Ray. 1257
(1976).
' See id. at 1328 n.334.
9 Jury awards had been reinstated or upheld on appeal in only three cases: Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1975) ($100,000), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
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proved by an appellate court at the time was for $250,000 in Cali-
fornia for the fraudulent marketing of a dangerous drug.10 Signs
that the judicial environment was changing were apparent," and I
concluded then that "[tlhe assimilation of the punitive damages
remedy into the field of products liability has just begun. 1 12 The
recent affirmance of the verdict in Grimshaw demonstrates that
the assimilation is now in full swing.
There has been considerable ferment in this field in the last
few years. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently rein-
stated a $5 million punitive damages award in a crashworthiness
case for injuries to the driver of a "diminutive" Honda automo-
bile.18 Two state supreme courts have also upheld million dollar
punitive awards in products liability cases. In Gryc v. Dayton-
Hudson Corp.,14 the Minnesota Supreme Court approved such an
award in a case against Riegel Textile Corporation for its failure to
add flame retardants to the cotton flannelette it sold for use in
nightgowns for young girls. More recently, the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed such an award in an action against American Mo-
tors for failing properly to crash-test one model of its Jeep for the
durability of its roll-bar in forward pitchovers.15
In addition, there have been of late several multi-million
dollar punitive damages awards at the trial level in products liabil-
ity cases,' and several important judicial opinions have been writ-
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967) ($250,000,
as remitted by trial court); Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 IlM. App. 2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636
(1969), aff'd, 46 Ill. 2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970) ($10,000).
10 Toole v. Richardson-Merrel Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). The
case involved the sale of MER/29, an anticholesterol drug. See generally Owen, supra note
7, at 1329-32. The plaintiff had accepted a remission to $250,000 of the jury's $500,000
award as a condition of the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial. 251
Cal. App. 2d at 693-94, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
1 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1261.
22 Id. at 1371.
IS Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981).
14 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
15 Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
6 See, e.g., Chastain v. Lynndale Int'l, Inc., No. CIV-80-23 (Cir. Ct., Cleburne Cty.,
Ark., Sept. 4, 1981) ($3 million punitive damages jury verdict); Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co.,
No. C60442 (Dist. Ct., Denver Cty., Colo., filed July 30, 1979) ($6.2 million punitive damages
jury verdict); Moll v. Toyota Motor Co., No. 79-17458 (Cir. Ct., Broward Cty., Fla., Sept. 8,
1981) ($3 million punitive damages jury verdict); Wolmer v. Chrysler Corp., No. 78-1130
(Cir. Ct., Broward Cty., Fla., Aug. 28, 1981) ($3 million punitive damages jury verdict);
Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., No. 78-L-2775 (Cir. Ct., St. Clair Cty., Ill., Oct.
26, 1979) ($15 million punitive damages jury verdict; remitted by trial judge to $7.5 million,
Mar. 10, 1980); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, No. 23,608 (Dist. Ct., Matagorda Cty., Tex., May
19821
The University of Chicago Law Review
ten on the issue.17 In one such case, Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.,18
the jury returned a $10 million punitive damages verdict for the
design of-the fuel system of a truck tractor that tipped over and
caught fire. Issuing a detailed opinion explaining his rationale, the
federal trial judge granted in part the defendant's motion for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict and set aside the jury's verdict
for punitive damages.19 The court's judgment was affirmed by a
split panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 20 and the
full court has agreed to rehear the case en banc.2 ' In Palmer v.
A.H. Robins Co.,22 involving complications from the design of the
Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine device, a Colorado jury returned a
punitive damages verdict of $6.2 million; that case is presently on
appeal. In Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day,23 the jury awarded $2.9 mil-
lion in punitive damages for design and warnings inadequacies in a
revolver to a man who was shot in the leg when he dropped the
gun. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the evidence
would support a punitive award of only $250,000 and remanded for
a new trial;24 on rehearing, the court mysteriously approved imme-
diate entry of a remitted punitive damages judgment of $500,000.25
Other important cases presently on appeal include a judgment
against Ford, involving the slippage of a transmission from the
park position to reverse, in which a Texas jury awarded $4 million
in punitive damages,20 and a $15 million verdict in Illinois, remit-
ted by the trial judge to $7.5 million, involving the design of an
29, 1980) ($4 million punitive damages jury verdict).
17 The significant judicial opinions written in this area since 1976 include Drayton v.
Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1978), modifying and aff'g 395 F. Supp. 1081
(N.D. Ohio 1975); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), affd, 623
F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980); Sturm, Ruger
& Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); Moore v. Remington Arms
Co., 100 11. App. 3d 1102,427 N.E.2d 608 (1981); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan,
45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727
(Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980).
18 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc
granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
19 Id. at 961-66. The court allowed the verdict for $150,000 actual damages to stand.
20 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980) (2-1 decision).
21 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
22 No. C60442 (Dist. Ct., Denver Cty., Colo., filed July 30, 1979).
23 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980).
:, Id. at 48-49.
5 615 P.2d 621, 624 (Alaska 1980).
28 Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, No. 23608 (Dist. Ct., Matagorda Cty., Tex., May 29, 1980).
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International Harvester tractor's gasoline fuel system.2 7 A number
of other appellate decisions in recent years have examined in dif-
fering contexts punitive damages awards in products liability
cases.
28
" Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co., No. 76-L-2775 (Cir. Ct., St. Clair Cty., Ill.,
Oct. 26, 1979).
" See, e.g., Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1980)
(affirming trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict setting aside $60,000 punitive
damages award against manufacturer of artificial fingernail kit containing chemicals whose
fumes made plaintiff ill); McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 160 (8th Cir.)
(affirming trial court's vacation of a $45,000 punitive damages award in suit for injuries
suffered in fall from commode chair manufactured by defendant), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864
(1978); d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 894 & n.18 (9th Cir. 1977)
(approving submission to jury of punitive damages claim in suit against manufacturer of
flammable fiber used in hotel carpeting that caught fire, killing plaintiff's decedent; no puni-
tive award by jury); Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1002-03 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(affirming directed verdict for defendant manufacturer on punitive damages claim by motor-
cyclist injured in collision with station wagon manufactured by defendant); In re Northern
Dist. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
(conditional certification of national class action on punitive damages claims), full op. is-
sued, No. 80-2213 (Nov. 5, 1981); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d
720, 726 (Arl%. 1981) (reversing punitive damages award of $500,000 against manufacturer of
grain-cart in which a child caught his leg); American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459,
467-68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing directed verdict for defendant car manufacturer
on punitive damages claim); Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) (holding that evidence did not support a $70,000 punitive damages award in
suits against owner of tank truck and others arising from explosion of liquid petroleum that
escaped from truck), cert. denied, 365 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1978); Auto Specialties Mfg. Co. v.
Boutwell, 335 So. 2d 291, 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (affirming directed verdict denying puni-
tive damages to a plaintiff injured when hydraulic jack manufactured by defendant ex-
ploded), cert. dismissed, 341 So. 2d 1080 (Fi. 1976), disapproved on other grounds, Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 358 So. 2d 1339, 1343 (Fla. 1978); Beerman
v. Toro Mfg. Corp., 615 P.2d 749, 755 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1980) (holding that satisfaction of
compensatory judgment against defendant city would not bar recovery of punitive damages
against distributor and manufacturer of city-operated power mower that threw object into
plaintiff's eye; claims against distributor and manufacturer had been dismissed by trial
court); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 Ill. App. 3d 678, 685-86, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1085-86
(1981) (affirming dismissal of punitive damages claim against manufacturer of tractor from
which plaintiff operator was thrown); Conder v. Hull Lift Truck, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 538, 547
(Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding trial court's refusal of plaintiff's instruction on "willful and
wanton misconduct"; jury verdict for defendant manufacturer of forklift truck that rolled
over, severely injuring plaintiff); Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 226 Kan. 681, 686-87,
602 P.2d 1326, 1331 (1979) (affirming $18,500 punitive damages award against manufacturer
of aluminum stepladder that collapsed, injuring plaintiff); Harley-Davidson Motor Co. v.
Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700, 705 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (vacating $1.9 million punitive
damages award for defective assembly of motorcycle throttle); Racer v. Utterman, 1981
PROD. Lmn. REP. (CCH) 9082 (Mo. Ct. App. Sept. 22, 1981) (reversing $500,000 punitive
damages award against manufacturer of flammable surgical drape for failure to instruct on
issues of manufacturer's fault and knowledge of danger); Rawlings Sporting Goods Co. v.
Daniels, 619 S.W.2d 435, 439-41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (affirming $750,000 punitive damages
award to high school football player against manufacturer of helmet for failure to warn
1982]
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When I studied this issue last, I concluded that such damages
are appropriate on those infrequent occasions when a manufac-
turer is proven to have been flagrantly at fault in selling a defec-
tive product. My purpose then was to demonstrate the validity in
principle of allowing punitive damages awards in appropriate prod-
ucts liability cases, and I offered guidelines for helping to deter-
mine their proper application.2 9 Such awards have become well ac-
cepted in principle, and my concern is now that large awards of
this type are becoming almost common.30 I have noted recently the
importance of thinking through the fundamental values underlying
the range of choices that face the courts in products liability cases
in the years ahead.31 Large assessments of punitive damages may
not yet be a major threat to the continued viability of most manu-
facturing, concerns, but the increasing number and size of such
awards may fairly raise concern for the future stability of Ameri-
can industry.2
against risk of subdural hematoma brain injury); Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15, 18
(Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (affirming judgment notwithstanding the verdict setting aside $60,000
punitive damages awards in suit against beverage distributor and bottling company by
plaintiff whose eye was struck by ejected twist-off cap); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis.
2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (interlocutory appeal) (approving award of punitive damages
in products liability suits); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 152-56,
293 N.W.2d 897, 905-08 (1980) (affirming jury awards of $70,000 in punitive damages
against manufacturer of baseball pitching machine, the arm of which struck plaintiff). See
also United School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196, 211 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981)
(affirming $600,000 punitive damages award for fraud by manufacturer of roofing system);
Kirschnik v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 478 F. Supp. 842, 844-45 (E.D. Wis.
1979) (holding that Wisconsin law did not allow punitive damages in products liability ac-
tions based on negligence or strict liability).
19 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1319, 1361-71. The factors are restated in notes 120, 242
infra.
30 See Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 IM. App. 3d 1102, 1114, 427 N.E.2d 608, 616-
17 (1981) ("The tide has ... turned: judgments for punitive damages are now routinely
entered across the nation, and staggering sums have been awarded.").
31 See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681
(1980); Product Liability: Hearings on H.R. 5571 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 470-75, 476-91 (statements of David G. Owen).
32 See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 331, 294 N.W.2d 437, 472 (1980)
(Coffey, J., dissenting) ("The implications for the free enterprise system, and therefore the
structure of our economy, are too disturbing to leave a decision of this magnitude to five
jurists."). See also Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 1981, at 86, for observations of products liability law-
yers on the increasing frequency of cases of this type; H. Nolte (Vice President & Gen.
Counsel, Ford Motor Co.), Comments on Products Liability Law 20-23 (unpublished address
to ABA Comm. on Corporate Law Departments, Spring 1981) (on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review). See generally U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PRODUCT LiABmrry, FiNAL REPORT VII-75 to -80 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
F NAL REPORT] (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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The time is ripe, then, to take a close look at the other side of
the punitive damages question."3 My purpose in this article is to
examine the problems and limitations endemic to such awards in
products liability litigation, to formulate afresh the appropriate
standards for punitive damages liability in this context, and to fo-
cus briefly on the controls available to prevent abuse. Many of the
issues examined apply in contexts other than products liability ac-
tions against manufacturing companies, particularly where other
institutional defendants are involved. 4
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
The traditional principles of punitive damages law should be
reviewed before the special problems faced by manufacturers de-
fending punitive damages claims in products liability cases can be
understood. Punitive (or "exemplary") damages are assessed in ad-
dition to compensatory damages to punish a defendant who com-
33 For recent commentary on punitive damages in products liability cases, see J. BIAS-
LEY, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 651-70 (1981); R.
EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LBLmrrY LAw 176-90 (1980); 3 L. FRUMER & M. FRIDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABIrrY § 36A (1980 & Supp. 1981); G. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAM-
AGEs-LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 6.01-.38 (1981); K. REDDEN, PUNITI DAMAGES § 4.2(A)(2)
(1980); DuBois, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury, Products Liability and Professional
Malpractice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster, 43 INs. COUNS. J. 344 (1976); Fulton, Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Cases, 15 FORUM 117 (1979); Hoenig, Products Liability and
Punitive Damages, 1980 INs. L.J. 198; Igoe, Punitive Damages: An Analytical Perspective,
Tltm, Nov. 1978, at 48; Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Ap-
proach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Owen, supra note 2; Schmitt & May, supra note 2;
Note, Mass Liability and Punitive Damages Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1797 (1979); Com-
ment, Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 895 (1976). See also
Note, In Defense of Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 303 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
N.Y.U. Note]. Other articles in this area are cited in Owen, supra note 7, at 1260 n.9.
"A variety of significant punitive damages assessments has been levied against non-
manufacturing institutional defendants in recent years. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979) ($10 million punitive damages verdict and judg-
ment for radiation injury to worker in nuclear fuel-processing plant where defendant opera-
tor allegedly allowed plutonium to escape), rev'd in part, No. 79-1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11,
1981) (2-1 decision) (punitive damages under state law preempted by Price-Anderson Act);
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979)
($5 million punitive damages verdict, for bad faith failure to investigate properly insured's
disability insurance claim, reversed for excessiveness), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912
(1980); Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1980)
($10 million verdict and judgment for punitive damages for fraudulent home improvement
program vacated unless plaintiff accepted remission to $2.5 million), appeal dismissed, 450
U.S. 1051 (1981); Hall v. Consolidated Edison Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 565, 428 N.Y.S.2d 837
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (tenant slipped on wax drippings in darkened hallway of apartment dwelling
where defendant utility had cut off electricity for landlord's nonpayment of bill; $5 million
punitive damages verdict reversed unless plaintiff accepted remission to $50,000).
The University of Chicago Law Review
mits an aggravated or outrageous act of misconduct against the
plaintiff and to deter the defendant and others from similar misbe-
havior in the future.35 Punitive damages are considered quasi-crim-
inal, a remedy standing halfway between the civil and the criminal
law: the purpose of such damages is punishment and deterrence
rather than compensation, yet the punitive assessment is awarded
to the plaintiff in a private lawsuit.36 For procedural purposes,
however, punitive damages are treated as civil law damages, so
that criminal law safeguards (such as the prohibitions against
double jeopardy, excessive fines, and compulsory self-incrimina-
tion) generally have not been applied.
3 7
All states except four"5 appear to have doctrines allowing for
punitive damages in some form, although in a few states such
awards are viewed as a form of additional compensation and thus
are somewhat limited in amount.39 Punitive damages are not avail-
able in most states for breach of contract;40 some states prohibit
their award in wrongful death actions;41 and some place a variety
35 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) & comment a (1979) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT].
11 See id. § 908 comment a (purposes of punitive damages and criminal fines are the
same).
37 See generally Comment, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defen-
dant, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 408 (1967).
" These four are Louisiana, see, e.g., Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 884 (La. 1980);
Massachusetts, see, e.g., Caperci v. Huntoon, 397 F.2d 799, 801 (1st Cir.) (dictum), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Nebraska, see, e.g., Prather v. Eisenmann, 200 Neb. 1, 11, 261
N.W.2d 766, 772 (1978); and Washington, see, e.g., Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 27
Wash. App. 512, 521-22, 618 P.2d 1330, 1337 (1980) (no punitive damages in absence of
statutory authorization). See also N.Y.U. Note, supra note 33, at 303 n.2.
39 By statute, Connecticut limits punitive damages in products liability cases to twice
the amount of compensatory damages. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1981).
See note 247 infra.
40 Except in certain limited situations. See Art Hill Ford, Inc. v. Callender, 423 N.E.2d
601 (Ind. 1981); see generally 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964). Nor, as a result, are
such damages generally available for breach of warranty. See U.C.C. § 1-106(1) (1978). See
generally Owen, supra note 7, at 1271-77; Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Con-
tract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1977); Note,
The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in Contract Actions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668
(1975); Comment, Punitive Damages on Ordinary Contracts, 42 MONT. L. REv. 93 (1981).
41 Such damages are not available in wrongful death actions unless a statute expressly
or by clear implication so provides. See, e.g., Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260,
311-15, 294 N.W.2d 437, 463-65 (1980). Also suing Ford in Grimshaw were the heirs of the
driver of the accident vehicle who were denied their claims for punitive damages for wrong-
ful death. See 119 Cal. App. 3d at 824-36, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 392-99. The constitutionality of
the denial was unsuccessfully challenged on equal protection grounds in Grimshaw, id. at
832-63, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 397-99, as it has been in other recent cases; see In re Paris Air
Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980); Huff v. White Motor
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of other limitations on their availability.42 Punitive damages are
permitted by various state and federal statutes (and by constitu-
tional provision in some states) for a variety of wrongs, sometimes
in the form of double, treble, or quadruple damages.43
The amount of a punitive damages award in most states is left
to the discretion of the jury, which considers the seriousness of the
defendant's misconduct, the nature and extent of the plaintiff's in-
jury (as measured by the compensatory damages), and the
"wealth" of the defendant (on the theory that it takes more to
punish a rich man than a. poor one)." Some states require that
such an award bear a reasonable relationship in amount to the
compensatory award,"5 but this rule is often applied flexibly so
that ratios of thirty to one or higher are sometimes approved."
Punitive damages have been the subject of substantial criti-
cisms by some courts and commentators for many years. In addi-
tion to the absence of criminal law procedural safeguards in their
application, such damages are criticized generally for being incon-
sistent with the civil law's focus on providing compensation for
losses, for giving plaintiffs undeserved "windfalls," for having no
objective standard for determining their propriety or amount in in-
dividual cases (which may make them largely unpredictable and
effectively nonreviewable), and for being designed to deter miscon-
duct when there is no good proof that they do.47 Yet punitive dam-
ages awards are a fixture of the civil law, dating back at least to
Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. International Harvester Co., 487 F. Supp.
1176 (D.N.D. 1980); Robert v. Ford Motor Co., 73 A.D.2d 1025, 424 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1980).
42 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908 comment L
4" See, e.g., Rivers v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 100 Mich. App. 824, 300 N.W.2d 420 (1980)
($450,000 compensatory award required to be trebled under malicious prosecution statute).
See also Comment, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60
CALiu. L. Rav. 191 (1972). See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 1264-65 n.23.
" See REsTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908(2) & comments b-e.
" See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 964-66 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(Texas law described but held not binding), afid, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc
granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F.
Supp. 255, 264 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (Pennsylvania law cited). See also Leimgruber v. Claridge
Assocs., Ltd., 73 N.J. 450, 375 A.2d 652 (1977). See generally Comment, Punitive Damages
and the Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAc. L.J. 823
(1978).
41 See, e.g., Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 964-66 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ($10
million punitive damages verdict, some 60 times greater than compensatory verdict for
$150,000, held within flexible ratio rule, as applied in Texas; punitive verdict stricken on
other grounds), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th
Cir. 1980).
" See Owen, supra note 7, at 1267 n.41.
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the Code of Hammurabi of 2000 B.C.,4" and criticisms notwith-
standing they appear likely to remain in general use for some time.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILTY CASES
Products liability cases present a variety of problems that
complicate the application of the traditional punitive damages
rules. Several recurring issues in such cases are reviewed here
briefly, and others will be examined in the parts that follow.
A. Juror Limitations and Attitudes
A jury trial presents difficulties for the fair administration of a
complex products liability case, and the problems are aggravated
by the presence in the case of a punitive damages claim. Plaintiffs
do not by any means win all products liability cases, even for com-
pensatory damages, and in fact the odds at present appear to favor
the manufacturer when such cases go to trial."9 Yet a full explana-
tion of the manufacturer's decision making process (which is on
trial in a punitive damages case) is necessarily complex and some-
what dull,50 and jurors easily can become confused and bored by
the technical evidence. Cases often drag on for weeks or even
months, with one expert witness following another,51 and the inter-
est, attention, and comprehension of many jurors often are left far
behind. The engineering complexity of the typical design case is
multiplied considerably by the difficult concepts and issues of
value added by the allegation of flagrant manufacturer misbehav-
ior. The desirability of jury trial in other types of complex civil
,' See id. at 1262-64 & nn. 17-23.
9 Studies of recent products liability case outcomes vary in their results, with defen-
dants prevailing in 50-75% or more of the cases. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN, & J. MONTGOM-
ERY, PRODuCTS LABILTY AND SAFETY: CAsEs AND MATERIALs 28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
W. KFTON].
'0 See generally Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. Rav. 1531 (1973); Henderson, Should a
"Process Defense" Be Recognized in Product Design Cases?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 585 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Process Defense]; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher, & Piehler, Shifting
Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv.
347 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Shifting Perspectives]; Weinstein, Twerski,
Piehler, & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L.
REv. 425 (1974).
51 Products liability cases frequently involve hundreds of photographs, exhibits, and
films and often resolve down to a battle of the experts. See, e.g., Jenkins v. General Motors
Corp., 446 F.2d 377, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972). See generally
W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 56-58 & nn.1-3.
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litigation presently is under reconsideration by some courts" and
commentators;53 it may be that the debate should be broadened to
include complex products liability cases, particularly those involv-
ing claims for punitive damages."
In addition to problems of comprehension, jurors have a natu-
ral sympathy for a seriously injured person that is reinforced when
the defendant is a manufacturer, 55 for many persons are hostile to-
ward major institutions in general and "big business" in particu-
lar." Some jurors may thus be tempted to resort to simplistic ex-
planations of the issue (such as that the defendant callously
"traded lives for dollars") that comport with their preconceived
notions of manufacturers' oppression of consumers.
Such preconceptions may generally be tolerable in determin-
ing compensatory liability. Because most companies are insured
against such losses,5 7 and because they have greater access to much
of the crucial evidence and greater financial resources with which
to defend their cases, a little bias in favor of compensating the in-
jured user of a product may in fact be good. For even if a "close-
call case"58 is "wrongly" rendered for the plaintiff, his suffering
51 Compare Cotten v. Witco Chem. Corp., 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981) with Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
5 See, e.g., Arnold, A Historical Inquiry Into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex
Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: En-
glish Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. Rhv. 43 (1980); Ed-
quist, The Use of Juries in Complex Cases, 3 CORP. L. Rav. 277 (1980); Jorde, The Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial of Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIn. L. Rav. 1 (1981); Note, The
Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARv. L. Rzv. 898 (1979); Note, Pre-
serving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN . L. Ray. 99 (1979); Note,
Complex Civil Litigation: Reconciling the Demands of Due Process with the Right to Trial
by Jury, 42 U. Prrr. L. REV. 693 (1981); Annot., 54 A.L.R. Fan. 733 (1981).
I Bifurcation of the punitive damages issues at trial, separating the functions of jury
and judge, is discussed below. See text and notes at notes 244-251 infra.
" See, e.g., note 61 infra.
This negative bias is fed by the television media, which usually portray businessmen
as foolish, greedy, or criminal. See Ti MEiA INsTrrurra, CROOKS, CONMEN AND CLOWNS:
BusINEssaN IN TV ENTERTAiNmENT (L. Theberge ed. 1981). The study concluded:
The business world in general is portrayed in a rather curious light-as the embodi-
ment of all that is wrong with American capitalism. Bosses reap major rewards at the
expense of both their workers and the general public. The interests of business are
unalterably opposed to those of working people and consumers. What is good for busi-
ness is not likely to be in the interest of American society.
Id. at 32.
5 Increasingly, however, the high cost of products liability insurance is forcing manu-
facturers to self-insure, at least to the extent of accepting considerably higher deductibles
and lower limits. See generally TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 32, ch. VI.
" This apt descriptive phrase is used by Twerski, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 50,
at 384. For a fuller discussion, see the classic rock tubs analysis in Henderson, Process De-
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will be lessened, and the institutional "suffering" of the manufac-
turer will be limited to the amount of the plaintiff's actual loss, his
compensatory damages. Only infrequently, and only in a few juris-
dictions, will such "wrong" decisions against a manufacturer reach
one million dollars.59 We thus may wish to tolerate, and perhaps be
able to afford, a little such compassion at the expense of some effi-
ciency.6e The stakes are increased considerably, however, in both
principle and amount, when claims are made for punitive damages.
The presence of such claims places a premium on the oratorical
and other trial skills of counsel in products cases, raising a special
risk of tapping juror bias that may test the limits of fair
adjudication."
fense, supra note 50.
"9 This is not to say that million dollar awards are rare in products cases; such awards
are becoming more frequent. My hypothesis here is that the improper assessment of such
high awards is infrequent. Although the figures are now somewhat dated, studies relied
upon by the federal Interagency Task Force in 1976-77 showed the average award to be
$222,000 for the period 1971-76. See W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 28.
60 But cf. Owen, supra noie 31, at 703-07 (questioning compassion as a proper basis for
shifting losses in a world of scarce resources).
61 One plaintiffs' lawyer, Gerry Spence of Jackson, Wyoming, demonstrates the point.
Although he "regularly takes on the polished lawyers who represent powerful corporations,"
he reportedly has not lost a jury case in twelve years. Tnm, Mar. 30, 1981, at 48. Spence
represented the interests of Karen Silkwood in the plutonium contamination case of
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), rev'd in part, No. 79-
1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981), where the jury awarded $10 million in punitive damages, and
a former Miss Wyoming in her libel case against Penthouse magazine, where the jury
awarded damages, mostly punitive, of $26.5 million. TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 48. "Says one of
Spence's victims: 'He's so good that he shouldn't be permitted in a courtroom.'" Id.
Another such lawyer may be Sheldon Schlesinger, "recognized by his peers as one of the
best, if not the best trial lawyer in Broward County," Florida. Fort Lauderdale News & Sun-
Sentinel, Sept. 13, 1981, at lB, col. 1 (emphasis in original). Mr. Schlesinger, a member of
the Inner Circle of Trial Lawyers who has won "five or six" verdicts of at least $1 million,
id. at col. 2, recently won a $5 million verdict (including $3 million in punitive damages) in a
Toyota crashworthiness case brought for the deaths of three sisters. See Moll v. Toyota
Motor Co., No. 79-17458 (Cir. Ct., Broward Cty., Fla., Sept. 8, 1981). Schlesinger's "court-
room style" in the case reportedly "could best be described as bordering on uncontrollable
emotional frenzy." Fort Lauderdale News & Sun-Sentinel, Sept. 13, 1981, at 11B, col. 1. One
episode during the trial was described as follows:
The quintessential Schlesinger-extracting pathos from statistics-emerged when
Toyota called witness B.J. Campbell, director of the Highway Safety Research Center
at the University of North Carolina.
Campbell testified he had studied 1,047 rear-end collisions involving 1971-73
Toyota Coronas in North Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland and New York-the only
states from which he could get complete statistics.
Of those 1,047 accidents, none involved fires, Campbell said, so the Corona appears
to be as safe as any other car.




B. Changing Social Values and Economic Conditions Over Time
Certain effects of the "time dimension" in products cases have
been examined recently by Professor James Henderson, 2 and
these problems have particular relevance to punitive damages
claims. A product may be designed in one decade, manufactured
and sold in the next, and produce injury in another; a suit involv-
ing the product may go to trial in the next decade, and perhaps not
be reviewed on appeal until yet another decade has begun.63 In
Grimshaw, for example, the Pinto was designed in the 1960's, the
car at issue was made and involved in the accident in the early
1970's, the trial was held in 1977 and 1978, the first appeal was
decided in 1981, and the case goes on.6 Before the case is finally
resolved, an entire generation may have passed. Nor are substan-
tial time delays uncommon in products litigation; a case where the
design and final appeal both take place in the same decade may
today be more the exception than the rule.e5
The problem, of course, is that society's values concerning
safety and corporate responsibility have been evolving rapidly in
recent years.6 It is one thing to judge according to today's higher
standards the "safety" or "defectiveness" of a product that was
"Denise Moll! Pamela Moll! Wendy Moll!" he thundered. "They were not even a
statistic in your data bank! They were not even a statistic in your data bank!"
Using timing and tone of voice any actor would envy, Schlesinger reeled off eight
rear-end collisions in which Coronas caught on fire in California. Seven people died.
After relating each victim, Schlesinger demanded of Campbell, "Was that part of
your statistics?" Each time, Campbell quietly answered no.
Outside the courtroom, Rumberger [Toyota's lawyer] paid tribute to his oppo-
nent's ability to sway the attentive, four-man, two-woman jury-which includes a re-
tired milkman, a vending machine serviceman and an ex-mechanic-and said the case
may well turn on that.
"If you take the sympathy out of this case, they've got nothing," he said. "But as
long as there's sympathy there, it's very, very serious."
Miami Herald, Aug. 30, 1981, at 4B, cols. 5-6.
" Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALn. L.
REv. 919 (1981). See also Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability
Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. Rav. 663 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Reform];
Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L.
REv. 101, 115-19 (1977).
The problem has been particularly severe for manufacturers of industrial machinery,
such as punch presses, that may last for several decades. See, e.g., TASK FoRcE FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 32, at VII-22.
" See 119 Cal. App. 3d at 773-79, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 359-63.
61 But cf. Phillips, Proposed Reform, supra note 62, at 664-65 nn.10 & 11 (citing studies
that suggest most products liability actions do not involve older products).
" See generally Owen, supra note 31, at 705.
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made when concern for safety was much less, and to compensate a
victim accordingly for losses actually suffered. It is quite another
to exact enormous "punishment" from an enterprise, acting on our
greater social consciousness of today, for decisions that were made
pursuant to business ethics of times past by men and women who
since have left the company67 and perhaps this life. In our zeal to
punish abuses discovered today, we must be cautious not to over-
look the prevailing moral and business standards of the time
involved.
Another serious problem in these cases is that the financial
health of an enterprise may change substantially during significant
phases of the lawsuit. Ford Motor Company, for example, reported
record earnings of $1.67 billion for 1977 within days after the
Grimshaw jury returned its $125 million punitive damages verdict
in early 1978.e8 By the time the appellate opinion was issued in
1981, however, the fortunes of the automobile industry had
changed dramatically, and for 1980 Ford reported record losses of
$1.54 billion.69 Although such drastic changes in the financial
health of the enterprise being punished may not be sufficient
under current legal doctrine to open a punitive damages judgment
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, 0 such changes
demonstrate another problem of permitting multi-million dollar
awards of punitive damages. 1
$7 For example, Lee Iacocca, the driving force behind the Ford Pinto, see Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 774, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 360 (1981), is now president
of Chrysler Corporation.
" See Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1978, at 4, col. 1.
61 See id., May 15, 1981, at 2, col. 2. For 1981, Ford reported losses of $1.06 billion.
Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1982, at 7, col. 1. Likewise, International Harvester Company, a defen-
dant in several punitive damages cases, see, e.g., Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co.,
No. 76-L-2775 (Cir. Ct., St. Clair Cty., Ill., Oct. 26, 1979), is experiencing severe financial
difficulties at the present time. Its losses from operations for the year ending October 31,
1981, could exceed $500 million, Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1981, at 11, col. 1, and it soon may face
bankruptcy or acquisition, see id., Sept. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
70 Such changes probably are not sufficient to open up such judgments because "the
evidence must have been in existence at the time of the trial . . . ." 11 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2859, at 182 (1973). See FaD. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(2).
71 There are two additional aspects of the time dimension that present particular
problems to manufacturers in the punitive damages context. The first is inflation, which in
retrospect makes safety improvements passed by in former years look especially inexpensive
by today's standards. In Grimshaw, for example, the court appeared impressed by the
"cheapness" of the various design "fixes," which had ranged in projected cost at the time
from $1.80 to $9.95 per car. See note 149 infra. Yet the "inexpensiveness" of such design
changes must be viewed against the fact that Ford designed the car to sell for a total price
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C. Problems with Punishing a Manufacturing Entity
Punitive damages were developed largely as a punishment and
deterrent for trespassers, oxen thieves and other such human male-
factors.72 When the device is transferred to the complex bureau-
cracy of a modern manufacturing concern, the fit is awkward in
many respects. Final "decisions" concerning a complex product are
often the result of a splintered, bureaucratic process involving a
complicated combination of human judgments made by scores of
persons at different levels in the hierarchy who pass on different
aspects of the problem at different times. Various engineers may
have to rely upon the work of research chemists, physicists, and
other scientists; input from the financial and marketing arms of
the enterprise must be factored in along the way. The entire pro-
cess may take years .7  Each of these human actors makes decisions
based on his own motives and on different types and amounts of
information, and even the responsible executive at the end of the
decisional line can possess only a small bit of the total information
involved. Moreover, the corporate owners of the enterprise are usu-
ally far removed from most decisions of even the top executives.
This is not to say that institutional safety procedures cannot
be put in place and monitored to ensure that safety gets its day in
the manufacturer's decisional court, and the modern company
without procedures of this type should be held to some account.7 4
of only $2,000. See 119 Cal. App. 3d at 774, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
Another problem often overlooked is the institutional lethargy inherent in any large
bureaucracy. It simply takes a good deal of time for a large institution to perceive and un-
derstand the nature of a safety problem, to study whether it can be remedied feasibly, and
to decide upon and then to accomplish a corrective course of action. In at least two recent
cases, courts have appeared insensitive to this problem. See Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware
Co., 226 Kan. 681, 687, 602 P.2d 1326, 1331 (1979) (citing continued manufacture and mar-
keting of stepladder for "many months" after notice of ladder's weaknesses); Wussow v.
Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 152-56, 293 N.W.2d 897, 905-07 (1980) (find-
ing no attempt to warn prior purchasers or to add product safety features during year fol-
lowing the acquisition of manufacturer by successor corporation).
7' Apparently the first reported American case allowing punitive damages was Genay v.
Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay.) 6 (1784), where the defendant, a doctor, added a large quantity of
cantharides (Spanish fly) to the plaintiff's glass of wine as a practical joke.
7 The period between initial conception to production of a new model car has been
estimated to average 43 months. See Dowie, supra note 2, at 20-21. Although the Pinto's
development is said to have been cut to under 25 months to meet quickly the competition
from foreign small car imports, id., a Ford document shows that the actual period of devel-
opment was between these two points, see Ford Motor Company, North American Sub-
Compact Car Study (1969) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
7' This was a central thesis of my earlier article. See generally Owen, supra note 7, at
1325-61.
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Yet we must remember that the concepts of moral responsibility,
punishment, and deterrence can mean vastly different things when
judging the "conduct" of an institution rather than of a human
being."6
The serious difficulty of attempting to apply human standards
of culpability to manufacturers in this context is highlighted by
the problem of defining the proscribed misconduct,7  an issue that
will be examined at length below. The problem in capsule form is
simply this: humans are clearly culpable when they act to gain a
minor advantage in a way they know will be likely to kill or injure
others. Thus, we usually punish a person who deliberately or reck-
lessly kills or maims another without good reason. Yet manufactur-
ers of hazardous products such as automobiles (which kill and
maim thousands every year) must design them in many different
ways they know with virtual certainty will result in harm or death
at some time to a certain number of unfortunate, statistical per-
sons. In a sense, then, such manufacturers always act "intention-
ally" in derogation of human life, yet surely punishment is inap-
propriate for simply being in the business of making high speed
machines.7
D. Documentation of Design Process Decisions
The key to winning a punitive damages case against a manu-
facturer is often said to lie in finding a "smoking gun" in the de-
fendant's files.7 8 The "powder keg" memorandum, for example,
was pivotal in the Gryc flammable fabrics case,7 9 as was Ford's
7 See authorities cited infra note 217.
7 See generally Landes & Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, 1 INT'L
REv. L. & ECON. 127, 139, 148-50 (1981); see also text and notes at notes 93-125 infra.
7 See text and notes at notes 105-119, 139 infra.
78 See J. Fetterly, Trial Strategy Considerations in Presenting a Punitive Damage
Claim in a Products Liability Case: The Plaintiff's Perspective 1 (Aug. 15, 1979) (unpub-
lished paper delivered to the Section on Insurance, Negligence, and Compensation Law,
ABA Annual Meeting, Dallas, Tex.) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
Fetterly, it should be noted, represented the plaintiff in Chastain v. Lynndale Int'l, Inc., No.
CIV-80-23 (Cir. Ct., Cleburne Cty., Ark., Sept. 4, 1981), in which the jury awarded punitive
damages of $3 million. He also recovered a total of $900,000 in punitive damages against
Celotex Corporation (also the defendant in Chastain) and Dow Chemical Company in
Oakhurst, Inc. v. Tasco, Inc., No. 27,015 (Dist. Ct., Freeborn Cty., Minn., Jan. 19, 1978)
(order denying post-trial motions and providing for stay).
79 Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 734, 740 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 921 (1980). This was an internal memorandum, entitled "Flammability-Liability,"
written in 1956 by one of the textile manufacturer's top officials: "'We are always sitting on
somewhat of a powder keg as regards our flannelette being so inflammable."' Id. at 734.
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cost-feasibility memorandum-examining various design improve-
ments for the Pinto fuel system-in the Grimshaw case.80 On rare
occasions such documents may in themselves prove a callous disre-
gard by corporate executives of human health or safety.1
In many cases, however, there are significant dangers of abuse
in the manipulation of documentary evidence. Manufacturers nec-
essarily create massive documentation of their design and produc-
tion processes,81 sometimes amounting to millions of pages of
notes, memoranda, and correspondence over the life of a product.
Especially during the initial design of the product, but also as
information returns on the product's performance in the field, re-
ports of many instances of one problem or another will be docu-
mented, acted upon, and filed away. In fact, the more a manufac-
turer is truly concerned about its product's safety, the more it will
encourage self-criticism and "negative" analyses of the product
within the company. 8 For example, it often is desirable during the
80 This was a "Fuel System Integrity Program Financial Review" report considered at a
product review meeting in April 1971 (Exhibit 125) that examined the financial impact of
alternative methods of meeting a proposed federal standard on fuel system integrity and the
cost savings that would result from deferring such modifications. See 119 Cal. App. 3d 757,
777-78 n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361-62 n.2. The report estimated cost savings from deferral at
$100 million, a calculation that was highlighted in the plaintiff's closing argument and that
apparently formed the basis for the jury's $125 million award. See Opening Brief for Appel-
lant Ford Motor Co., at 30-31, Grimshaw; note 243 infra.
See also Rimer v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 641 F.2d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 1981) (memo re-
vealing that aircraft manufacturer knew of fuel cap siphoning problem but chose not to
issue service bulletin because it feared that litigation would thereby be encouraged); M.
JOHNSTON, THE LAST NIN MINuTEs: THE STORY OF FLIGHT 981, at 234-37 (1976) (discussing
the "Applegate memo" predicting that the cargo door could detach from a DC-10 and cause
the loss of the plane). See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 1356-57 nn.478 & 479.
81 See Westin, Introduction to WHISTLE BLOWING! LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPO-
RATION 11 (A. Westin ed. 1981) (noting documents purportedly showing that asbestos manu-
facturers suppressed information on hazards of asbestosis).
"' See generally Twerski, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 50, at 369-72.
83 One may postulate that the most safety-conscious manufacturer will direct its em-
ployees to search out and investigate even remotely possible dangers, to explore even barely
plausible remedial measures, and to document the possibilities that dangers may be present
and cured. Among the range of dangers and remedies so documented, a manager with "due"
regard for consumer safety will act to reduce or eliminate such risks only to the extent that
it is reasonable to do so. Such a manager may therefore "consciously" yet reasonably choose
to leave in the product remote dangers that are too expensive to remove, and sometimes
even substantial dangers for which there is no practicable remedy. The documentation of
such a choice should not, of course, support a punitive award.
Another dimension of this problem concerns the variety of psychological make-ups of
the manufacturer's employees. The employees of a large manufacturing concern will enter-
tain a broad spectrum of diverse political and practical viewpoints on how much safety is
enough. At one extreme may be an engineer or marketing person who will decry any loss of
utility for safety, while at the other extreme may be an employee to whom safety is para-
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initial stages of a product's design to test it to its limits to discover
what those limits are: cars may thus be crash-tested until their gas
tanks burst, and rats may be injected with a drug in ever higher
doses until some die.s4 Documentary evidence (especially films) of
such tests can later return to haunt the manufacturer, as they did
in the Grimshaw Pinto case. 5 Such a manufacturer, constantly
striving to uncover sources of weakness in and dissatisfaction with
its products to produce an ever better product for the public, may
thereby create the documentary seeds for a punitive damages claim
in a future products suit."6
In the documentary background of most inherently dangerous
products will be some fair number expressing concern over many
of the significant choices in the design process.87 The lesson for a
plaintiff's lawyer facing a warehouse full of documents in a prod-
mount. One might characterize the persons at these extremes as "alarmists": the "utility
alarmists"--who characteristically will criticize the prototype or final product as "too safe,"
and the "safety alarmists"-who characteristically will find an "excess" of danger. While
memoranda from either type of alarmist will likely appear incriminating after a product
accident years later, the conscientious manufacturer may find the dialectical presentation of
such extreme viewpoints especially useful in establishing a counterpoint for informed deci-
sion making, somewhere toward the center of which will usually lie the "correct" decision as
to the level of safety. Tribunals must be cautious, therefore, not to place excessive weight on
internal memoranda criticizing product safety performance or proposing (or questioning)
improvements, for the source of such criticism may have been an alarmist whose advice was
properly rejected after due consideration. Although such documentation may, of course, be
highly relevant to the culpability issue, it will usually represent only a part of the much
larger puzzle of institutional motivation and rationale. Cf. Dorsey v. Honda Motor Corp.,
665 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting Honda's rejection of an employee's proposal to
enlarge the car's size or strength to increase safety).
See M. DIXON, DRUG PRODUCT LIABILrry § 6.05 (1980); W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE
RISK 64-70 (1976).
One piece of evidence that made a particular impact on the jury in Grimshaw was
Exhibit 122, a motion picture showing a prototype Pinto being crash tested. When the vehi-
cle was backed into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, "the filler neck of the fuel tank
separated allowing fluid to spill from the tank." 119 Cal. App. 3d at 791, 174 Cal. Rptr. at
370. A juror who was interviewed shortly after the verdict pointed to the dramatic impact
this film had made at trial: "The gas tank, filled with a nonflammable substance, ruptured
with such force ... that 'it looked like a fireman had stuck a hose inside the car and turned
it on.'" Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 4. Ford's objections to the relevance of the film,
a particularly sensitive issue in view of the substantial prejudice it obviously was bound to
engender, were based upon the fact that the Grimshaw car's filler neck did not separate,
unlike the crash test car. These objections were rejected by the court. 119 Cal. App. 3d at
791, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
0' See O'Donnell, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The Problem of Jury Instruc-
tions Which Do Not Instruct, 56 U. DEr. J. URB. L. 1051, 1067 (1979).
97 In fact, the Twerski group recently proposed a "process defense" predicated on the
creation and retention of documents of all such choices made. See Twerski, Shifting Per-
spectives, supra rkote 50, at 369-72.
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ucts case is clear. A skillful plaintiff's lawyer will often be able to
find and string together a series of such documents, plucked from
context among the thousands or millions in the company's files,
that may make the manufacturer look particularly insensitive to
consumer safety and more concerned about cutting costs. Although
the role of defense counsel is of course to explain away such docu-
ments, when a fair response can be made, the risks of abuse-and
the necessity for close judicial supervision-appear especially great
in this regard. By adopting appropriate safeguards against docu-
mentary abuse, the courts can help prevent manufacturers from
being discouraged from generating and retainings8 complete
records of a product's development, and thereby they can also ad-
vance the goals of product safety and compensation in proper
suits.
E. Measuring Wealth and Poverty
Because the defendant's wealth is a relevant factor in deter-
mining the amount of punitive damages,"9 one must inquire what
"wealth" really means in the case of a manufacturing entity. Basic
financial sheet data such as sales, profits, and net worth most often
have been regarded as the relevant indicators of a corporation's
"wealth."9' 0 Yet figures on a company's sales are often largely unre-
lated to a company's true financial prosperity, for very little of the
gross earnings remains-even when times are good-after deduct-
ing the costs of materials, labor, sales, administration, taxes, and,
increasingly, the cost of capital. Even profits after taxes are plainly
not idle wealth, because the enterprise will fail if the owners do not
receive a fair return on their investment. And even after the pay-
ment of dividends, although such retained "profits" may travel to
the balance sheet adding to net worth, the remaining dollars
hardly represent a pot of idle gold, ripe for plucking by the plain-
" The practical, legal, and ethical considerations involved in designing and implement-
ing corporate programs for document control-including creation, circulation, supervisor
and counsel review, alteration, supplementation, storage, surrender, and destruction-are
topics of especially great interest to in-house counsel and outside defense lawyers at current
continuing legal education programs on punitive damages. See, e.g., ABA National Institute
on the Trial of Punitive Damages Cases, Apr. 25-26, 1980 (L.A.), May 23-24, 1980 (Boston),
May 29-30, 1981 (N.Y.). See generally Fedders & Guttenplan, Document Retention and
Destruction: Practical, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 5 (1980);
Note, Legal Ethics and the Destruction of Evidence, 88 YALE L.J. 1665 (1979).
" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908(2).
90 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1318 n.295.
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tiff and his lawyer, for usually they will be reinvested in plant,
equipment, salaries, and other future costs of operation-"the
costs of staying in business.""1 Moreover, a large assessment of
punitive damages against an enterprise will affect at least to some
extent its earnings, and hence, most likely, the value of its stock.
92
These are difficult notions for juries to understand, and the
sophistication of many judges on such matters also leaves much to
be desired. The difficult job of education will fall squarely upon
the shoulders of the defendant's financial experts, and the trial
court will have to hold a tight rein on evidence and argument in
this area where prejudice follows error with special ease. Yet even
when the evidence and argument on these matters are beyond re-
proach, the multi-million (sometimes billion) dollar figures dis-
cussed at trial may all begin to blur in the minds of many jurors. If
such be true, a typical juror may well be receptive to an argument
that anything less than $1 million would be but a drop in the
bucket and that much more than that would be required to catch
the attention of the company's executives and to teach them a
lesson.
III. DEFINING THE BASIS OF LIAsurrY
The place to focus initial inquiry for restricting abuses of the
punitive damages doctrine is in the formulation of the test of puni-
tive liability and in the types of evidence that go to meet that test.
This part first examines the standard for liability and then consid-
ers the types of evidence to which courts have recently pointed as
aggravating or mitigating the defendant's fault.
A. The Liability Test
One aspect of punitive damages doctrine in which remarkably
little change has occurred in the past few years, yet one where re-
91 See P. DRUCKER, MANAGING IN TURBULENT TIMEs 28-30 (1980).
92 The ripple effects through the affairs of an enterprise from a change in stock price
may be extensive, possibly affecting the cost and availability of capital and acquisition
opportunities.
Because the payment of a punitive damages judgment is ordinarily tax deductible to
the corporation, the effect of such awards on after-tax earnings is reduced considerably. See
Rev. Rul. 211, 1980-2 C.B. 57. Contrary to common sense and to common belief, see, e.g.,
Bus. WK., Jan. 12, 1981, at 86, punitive damages awards probably are not taxable to an
individual when received on account of personal injuries. See Rev. Rul. 45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.




finement is most needed, concerns the definition of the proscribed
misconduct. I have previously recommended a standard of liability
grounded upon the defendant's "flagrant indifference to the public
safety,"' s a test that I still believe fits well the special circum-
stances of most products cases. Most courts, unfortunately, includ-
ing the court in Grimshaw, have eschewed the "flagrant indiffer-
ence" standard and have opted instead to apply the broader, more
traditional liability standards, such as "willful," "wanton," "mali-
cious," "conscious," or "reckless" disregard of the rights of
others.9 4
The trial court's instruction in Grimshaw is probably the most
unsatisfactory of any that I have seen and demonstrates the vital
need to tailor the standard of liability closely to the manufacturing
context. The trial court there instructed the jury that "malice"95
could be "inferred from defendant's conduct if the conduct was
willful, intentional and done in conscious disregard of its possible
93 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1367.
" See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 658 (5th Cir. 1981) ("wantonness
or recklessness or reckless indifference to the rights of others"); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co.,
567 S.W.2d 655, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("complete indifference to or conscious disregard
for the safety of others"); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 308, 294 N.W.2d 437,
462 (1980) ("malice, vindictiveness, ill-will, or wanton, willful or reckless disregard of plain-
tiff's rights").
At least two courts have adopted the "flagrant indifference" standard. See Moore v.
Remington Arms Co., 100 IM. App. 3d 1102, 1115, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (1981); Leichtamer v.
American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981). See also Ellis v. Golconda Corp.,
352 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc.,
97 Wis. 2d 136, 156, 293 N.W.2d 897, 907 (1980). Perhaps the failure of more courts to adopt
the "flagrant indifference" standard reflects a reluctance to change established legal doc-
trine. Such a concern is misplaced, however, because the "flagrant indifference" standard is
merely a refinement of the more general standards, designed to narrow and apply those
standards to this type of litigation. See Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Il1. App. 3d
1102, 1115, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (1981).
'5 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1981), which authorizes awards of punitive
damages, provides as follows:
In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where the defen-
dant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the
actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing
the defendant.
Definitions of "malice," "oppression," and "fraud" were supplied by amendment in 1980.
"Malice," which was the pertinent standard in Grimshaw, is defined by the amendment as
follows:
"Malice" means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff or conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a conscious disregard of
the rights and safety of others.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(c)(1) (West Supp. 1981). The amendment did not apply to Grim-
shaw, where the court invoked the common law instead. See 119 Cal. App. 3d at 807-18, 174
Cal. Rptr. at 380-87.
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result.""6 The totally unacceptable import of this standard is that
every actor could be held strictly liable thereunder for punitive, in
addition to compensatory, damages for any consequence to any
person that was contemplated in advance of any course of action.
Virtually all important actions involve some risks to some peo-
ple, and responsible individuals and institutions give careful con-
sideration to such risks before they act. It is fundamental to life in
a dynamic world with an unpredictable future that one must pro-
ceed to act, notwithstanding the presence of some foreseeable
risks, provided that the benefits of the contemplated action (or in-
action) appear at the time to exceed the risks. If this basic tenet
of risk-benefit analysis were not virtually the universal rule, life
would grind nearly to a halt. Everyone employs this process hun-
dreds of times each day, ticking off the balance of advantages ver-
sus disadvantages (which may affect other persons adversely) of
one choice after another, often in only fractions of a second. The
91 119 Cal. App. 3d at 815, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Formulation of the standard of liabil-
ity was supplemented in the trial court's instructions by other phrases of arguable oppro-
brium, such as "motive and willingness. . . to injure," "willful" and "intentional," as noted
by the court of appeal. See id. at 817, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Yet the phrase "conscious
disregard of its possible result" clearly was the dominant phrase and concept in the instruc-
tion, and so its legitimacy and import fairly may be examined in isolation.
", There has been a resurgence in the last few years of the debate over the moral and
political legitimacy of cost-benefit (or efficiency) analysis. Some of the more recent articles
appear in a symposium in 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 485 (1980), and a response thereto in id. at
811. At bottom, many of the issues boil down to whether and when the greater interests of
one person or group should be promoted at the expense of the lesser interests of another,
and how the values to be accorded such interests should be calculated. In social decision
making, there are of course extremely difficult problems in measuring ("monetizing") and
comparing what are sometimes incommensurable assets and values, and certain "rights" by
definition should be held off limits to any scales. Yet life will continue to move forward
despite such hard decisions, and its "tragic choices" must be faced and somehow made. See
generally G. CALABREsi & P. BOBBnTr, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
In the products liability context, the fundamental question often involves a choice be-
tween the interests of consumers in cheaper and more functional products versus the inter-
ests of persons who may be injured by those products in receiving protection against and
compensation for such losses. Whether the legal level of product safety (the "defect" line) is
set at the point of cost-efficiency or somewhere else, the interests of persons injured by
product dangers falling on the no-liability side of the "defect" line are subordinated to the
interests of consumers as a group. A major value that appears to fall outside narrow cost-
efficiency analysis, but one that nevertheless receives substantial protection in products lia-
bility law (through the expectancy definition of defectiveness and requirements of warnings
of, and perhaps design protection against, hidden dangers) is the individuality of persons
seeking to lead autonomous lives free from unexpected interruption. There is often a tension
between these interests of efficiency and autonomy in products cases, a problem of funda-




rules of negligence law provide that an actor generally will not be
liable even for compensatory damages unless the balance of trade-
offs was a bad one-that is, one in which the costs98 exceeded the
benefits, thus making the action on balance cost-ineffective.99 Pun-
ishment for such decisions usually can be justified only when the
actor not only made the wrong decision but also made a deliberate
choice to advance his good over what he knew to be the greater
good of others.100 The trial court's instruction in Grimshaw is thus
palpably in error, as it justifies punishment for most significant de-
cisions even if made in all good faith, and even if on balance
good.101
The court of appeal recognized one facet of the instruction's
weakness in holding that "the rule should be expressed in terms of
probability of injury rather than possibility," although it concluded
that the error was harmless.10 2 The standard employed by the
court of appeal, "'conscious disregard' of the probability of injury
to members of the consuming public, 1 03 is better than the trial
court's instruction, because it more clearly provides that the con-
templated conduct must be likely to cause some harm. This formu-
lation of the standard nevertheless fails to address the central fact
that the essence of sound engineering requires that manufacturers
give careful consideration to the balance of risks and benefits per-
ceived. The fact that the word "disregard" obliquely may contem-
plate a mental state of culpable indifference does not solve the
problem. The decision to market a product in a certain condition
with certain risks may have been a good one because the expected
benefits were great, and the product may not have been legally de-
fective at all, yet under this standard the manufacturer remains
subject to punishment for "disregarding" the lesser risks by pro-
ceeding to sell the product with any danger whatsoever.104
,3 Negligence law, strictly speaking, speaks in terms of foreseeable "risks" rather than
"costs." See generally W. KEEToN, supra note 49, at 59-62, 238-51. The process perhaps
most usefully may be described as a "cost-cost" analysis: comparing the cost of accidents to
the cost of accident prevention. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STm. 29
(1972).
" See, e.g., Posner, supra note 98, at 32.
100 The manufacturer's "state of mind" is stated subjectively here to make the point
more clearly. See text and notes at notes 108, 123 infra.
101 See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 76, at 134 (case 4).
102 119 Cal. App. 3d at 816-18, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 386-87.
103 Id. at 813, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
I" The anomaly then would result that punishment would be authorized for conduct
deemed good by compensatory liability principles, an outcome at odds with logic and well-
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The principal fault with the "conscious disregard" portion of
the Grimshaw court's standard, then, is that it does not sufficiently
limit the area of proscribed misconduct. As discussed above, a
careful manufacturer should indeed be "conscious" of all foresee-
able and significant risks that necessarily result from the difficult
design trade-off decisions required to produce affordable products
that work well.10 5 All we should ask of manufacturers through any
legal rule is that all unreasonable dangers be removed from such
products, not that all products be made completely safe. A manu-
facturer thus can be punished fairly only for knowingly leaving in
its products dangers that are unreasonable-not for leaving in ex-
pected dangers that are too expensive to remove.110
The appellate court in Grimshaw referred at least twice in
passing to Ford's "callous" disregard or indifference to safety;
107
many of the problems outlined above would be solved if such a
term were adopted as the principal standard of liability. An actor
could not be said to be "callous" for proceeding to act in the face
of known risks unless the benefits to the actor expected to flow
from the conduct were known or strongly suspected to be
less-perhaps much less-than the expected harms to others. Nev-
ertheless, although "callous" may thus be an apt word to describe
especially culpable decisions of human actors, "flagrant" is proba-
bly better suited to institutional misconduct. "Flagrant" implies an
objective standard apart from the actor108 and indicates that, typi-
cally, only extreme departures from the norm, from accepted and
acceptable safety practices and engineering choices, will subject
the manufacturer to punishment. 10
Cost-benefit analysis is fundamental to the design engineer's
trade.1 0 The depth of the rubber on an automobile's bumper for-
ever may be increased by another one-tenth inch. One more cross-
beam always may be added to protect the occupants in certain
established doctrine. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908(1) comment b (for a punitive
damages claim to lie, "a cause of action for the particular tort must exist").
105 See text at note 77 supra.
108 See text and notes at notes 98-100 supra.
107 119 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 819, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 384, 388.
108 For a variety of good reasons, objective proof of the manufacturer's apparent atti-
tude toward consumer safety is a preferable standard to requiring subjective proof of the
company's "state of mind." See Owen, supra note 7, at 1368; see also note 123 infra.
109 See text and notes at notes ,124, 174 infra. Awareness of wrongdoing can fairly be
imputed to the manufacturer "when its conduct is obviously and seriously wrong." See
Owen, supra note 7, at 1369.
110 See authorities cited supra note 50.
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types of collisions. The configuration of crossbeams may be
changed to increase their strength; thicker or harder steel may be
used in the beams; perhaps they may be made of another metal, or
perhaps even of a form of plastic. Many hundreds of such choices
are made by design engineers in the production of a single complex
product, and each such decision involves a range of trade-offs be-
tween cost, weight, appearance, performance capabilities (for sepa-
rate functions in varying environments), and safety in one type of
accident versus another.111 A steel beam that protects an occupant
in one type of accident may endanger him in another, as by ren-
dering that portion of the vehicle less energy absorbent, and may
endanger pedestrians and the occupants of other vehicles as
well." 2 Although much of this decision making involves the appli-
cation of proven scientific principles, much is art, and some by its
nature can be little more than trial and error.
There is an increasing appreciation among courts1 3 and com-
mentators 14 of the inherent difficulties in judging the adequacy of
such complex design decisions in determining liability for compen-
satory damages. The courts must be even more vigilant to prevent
punitive awards from intruding too deeply into the heart of Ameri-
can industry. Many of our most important products, from air-
planes, cars, and tires, to guns, drugs, pesticides, and other chemi-
cals, are daily productive of injury, death, or disease. Surely we
should demand of their manufacturers that all reasonable steps be
taken to protect us against harm where feasible and affordable cur-
ative measures will not diminish unduly the usefulness of the prod-
ucts, 115 and in some circumstances we may fairly hold the manu-
facturers "strictly" to account for their failure to protect us.,' 6
" "[E]very one of a car's 14,000 parts can be modified in many ways, and every modifi-
cation will have effects that depend upon interactions with other parts." Wheeler, Costly
Mistrust, supra note 2, at 27. See also O'Donnell, supra note 86, at 1060.
112 This is to say nothing of the increases in weight and cost and decreases in roomi-
ness, maneuverability, and fuel efficiency that may result. See also Dawson v. Chrysler
Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
Is See, e.g., id.; Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 268 N.W.2d 291
(1978).
114 See generally Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence
[to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); Epstein, Prod-
ucts Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. Rzv. 643 (1978); O'Donnell,
supra note 86; Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 551 (1980).
115 The law of negligence liability for compensatory damages purports to promote this
goal. See generally Posner, supra note 98.
li For a variety of reasons, the principles of negligence in recent years have been
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Moreover, when a manufacturer knowingly sacrifices the public's
greater safety interests to reap a profit that it knows is worth much
less, punitive damages are in order.117 Yet many useful products
must be placed on the market with risks of unknown type or ex-
tent, and manufacturers must be protected scrupulously against
punishment for their good faith decisions to market such products,
even if they contain substantial risks.
Writing early in the products liability era, Professor Thomas
Cowan demonstrated that a manufacturer's choices involving nec-
essary safety trade-offs and statistically inevitable risks always can
be viewed in a sense as intentional wrongs to consumers hurt by
such products,118 as safe on balance as such products may actually
be. Although he did not propose that punitive damages be awarded
in such cases, the inherent deliberateness (or "consciousness") of
the manufacturing process is highlighted by his analysis. So too is
the need for a standard of punitive damages liability fashioned to
the context; only such a standard will ensure that the necessarily
deliberate nature of a manufacturer's decision making will not be
twisted artfully and unfairly into an appearance of conscious
wrongdoing. In a courtroom many years after the fact, especially
where the risks have proven to be greater than had been thought,
even the most conscientious design of a complex and risky product
can be made to look cold, calculating, and "callous," and as if the
manufacturer deliberately had "disregarded" the risks it could
foresee; of course in a sense it did, if it was properly doing its
job.L19
Guidance more precise than "flagrant indifference" to con-
sumer safety, however, is necessary for both manufacturers and the
tribunals that judge their conduct. In my earlier study, I offered
viewed increasingly as more appropriate than those of true strict liability for use in design
and warnings cases. See authorities cited supra note 114.
117 See text at note 100 supra.
18 See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 1077 (1965).
See also LeBel, Intent and Recklessness as Bases of Products Liability: One Step Back,
Two Steps Forward, 32 ALA. L. REv. 31, 41 (1980).
119 Although most (but by no means all) lawyers, judges, and public policy makers may
comprehend and agree with this point, one may seriously question whether the ordinary
person-or juror--can or would: "A lawyer may be hardened to the unpleasant realities
lurking beneath the genteel talk of 'balancing factors,' but unless he is instructed to the
contrary, the ordinary citizen might well believe a manufacturer has no moral authority to




several factors as guides in judging a manufacturer's behavior,120
and at least one court has found them useful in that regard.121 The
factors themselves simply represent the component parts of manu-
facturing decisions affecting safety and include principally the de-
gree of risk, the cost and availability of feasible measures to reduce
the risk, and the nature of the manufacturer's actions in light of its
awareness of the risk.
Although a manufacturer's culpability can be measured
against the framework of these factors, an affirmative definition of
the basis for liability should be provided to guide judge and jury.
An examination of the cases that have struggled with the issue
reveals that punitive damages generally are appropriate in only
two types of cases-those involving behavior of a fraudulent char-
acter, where the manufacturer purposefully created the danger in
an effort to trick consumers into buying the product,122 and those
in which the manufacturer chose to profit from exposing consum-
ers to a high risk of serious injury that it knew"" could easily be
avoided through feasible and economical curative measures. If the
facts of the case do not fit into either of these two classifications,
punitive damages probably are inappropriate and usually should
be stricken from the case.
Punitive damages ordinarily will be proper only in cases of ex-
treme departure from accepted safety norms in the particular in-
dustry. 2 " To avoid punitive damages assessments for simply erring
120 Those factors were as follows:
(1) the existence and magnitude in the product of a danger to the public;
(2) the cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an acceptable level;
(3) the manufacturer's awareness of the danger, of the magnitude of the danger, and of
the availability of a feasible remedy;
(4) the nature and duration of, and the reasons for, the manufacturer's failure to act
appropriately to discover or to reduce the danger; and
(5) the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully created the danger.
Owen, supra note 7, at 1369.
121 See Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
921 (1980), where the court analyzed the facts in terms of these and three additional factors:
"(6) the extent to which the defendants are subject to federal safety regulation; (7) the
probability that compensatory damages might be awarded against defendants in other cases;
and, finally, (8) the amount of time which has passed since the actions sought to be de-
terred." Id. at 739.
122 See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 1329-35.
123 Although the standard is stated here in subjective terms, the manufacturer's knowl-
edge should be capable of objective proof, tested by what it plainly should have known in
light of objectively provable facts. Its denial of such knowledge, therefore, will be relevant
but not conclusive on the point. See text and notes at notes 108-109 supra.
,21 See, e.g., Linscott v. Rainier Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 854, 858, 606 P.2d 958,
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on design decision "close calls," the standard must be interpreted
to provide a fair measure of breathing space for the manufacturer
to make good faith mistakes.
125
B. Matters of Aggravation
Courts in recent cases have pointed to various types of evi-
dence as tending to establish or aggravate a manufacturer's culpa-
bility. The following discussion examines several of the more im-
portant aggravating factors that have been emphasized.
1. Prior Complaints or Lawsuits. Several decisions have re-
lied heavily on evidence that the manufacturer had received a
number of complaints or had been the target of prior lawsuits con-
cerning a danger of the product at issue in the case.126 Such evi-
962 (1980) (bad faith refusal to honor insurance policy):
In Idaho, then, so long as the evidence shows that there has been an injury to the
plaintiff from an act which is an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of con-
duct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or a
disregard for its likely consequences (in the words of prior cases, with fraud, malice or
oppression), it is appropriate for the trier of fact to award punitive damages.
Compare the standard for "gross and wilful negligence" as described by Judge Learned
Hand in his first classic risk-benefit case, Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir.
1940) ("not only must the interest which he would have had to sacrifice be less than the risk
to which he subjects others, but it must so far fail to match that risk that some opprobrium
or reproach attaches to him"), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941). See also Ballen-
ger v. Mobil Oil Corp., 488 F.2d 707, 710 (5th Cir.) ("complete lack of any care by the
defendant, which if shown raises a presumption of conscious indifference .... The exercise
of even slight care defeats the presumption."), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980 (1974). Cf. Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (requiring on a similar rationale an "ex-
treme departure" from the journalistic norm to establish N.Y. Times malice). See text at
notes 109 supra and 174 infra. See also H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11(b) (1981)
(proposed products liability legislation requiring "a flagrant indifference to consumer
safety" and "an extreme departure from accepted practice" to establish punitive damages
liability).
2I For acknowledgements of the frequent need for design engineers to make close calls,
see Henderson, Process Defense, supra note 50, at 384; Twerski, Shifting Perspectives,
supra note 50, at 352. If punitive damages begin to be awarded in close-call cases, the entire
question of their insurability will have to be rethought, for.the policy considerations change
substantially. See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 1308-13.
126 See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1975) (at least 91
fires in color television sets reported to manufacturer), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976);
Cantrell v. Amarillo Hardware Co., 226 Kan. 681, 683-84, 602 P.2d 1326, 1331 (1979) (at
least five similar stepladder collapses); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740
(Minn.) (six lawsuits over seven years against manufacturer of untreated cotton flannelette
used in garments), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d
655, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (29 reports to manufacturer over four years of incidents involv-
ing fast idle cams); see also Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 374 (6th Cir. 1978)
(Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("defendant's callous argument that
'only' 59 other Liquid-plumr [caustic drain cleaner] injuries were reported to the defendant
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dence is important, for it tends to prove the existence of a hazard,
its seriousness, and the manufacturer's probable knowledge of its
existence. Conversely, the absence or small number of prior com-
plaints or lawsuits is of course compelling proof to show good
faith. 27
The bare fact of a large number of product failures, however,
falls far short of establishing the manufacturer's flagrant culpabil-
ity in selling the product. For punitive damages to be appropriate,
a further showing must be made that plainly available and eco-
nomical preventive measures were ignored by the manufacturer for
the purpose of saving corporate funds.128 Thus, although one tire
blowout or steering failure may look like any other to most con-
sumers (and jurors), many such failures often can be traced to
causes for which the manufacturer is not responsible. 129 A tire may
fail from abuse or wear as well as from a defect;13 0 a steering fail-
ure may be traced to a mechanic's error in repairLs  Moreover,
even failures properly attributable to the product itself may derive
is further proof of the need for punitive damages"); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v.
Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720, 727 (Ark. 1981) (Hickman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (at least two other lawsuits against manufacturer of grain buggy with unshielded
power takeoff shaft). See generally United School Dist. No. 490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d
196, 208-09 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
M See text and note at note 165 infra.
12s Of course, cost-savings motives in themselves must not be viewed as wrong, for man-
ufacturers must remain competitive in cost and pricing to survive and to continue making
products. Cf. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (asserting
there is a potential divergence of interests between claimants seeking punitive damages and
future consumers that increases with each award of punitive damages), aft'd, 623 F.2d 395
(5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980). The court argued that
"[p]resent tort law accepts the idea that manufacturers ought to be checked by deterrent
based remedies. Yet we ought not in our quest for public safety lose sight of the obvi-
ous-with no products, there are no consumers." Id. (emphasis in original).
128 See generally W. KFxroN, supra note 49, at 825-36.
", Courts often have refused to infer even liability for compensatory damages from the
occurrence of an accident involving a product. In addition to the accident, the plaintiff must
show the existence of a defect in the product and its causal relation to his injury. See, e.g.,
Shramek v. General Motors Corp., 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 78, 216 N.E.2d 244, 247 (1966):
The mere fact of a tire blowout does not demonstrate the manufacturer's negligence,
nor tend to establish that the tire was defective. Blowouts can be attributed to myriad
causes, including not only the care with which the tires are maintained, but the condi-
tions of the roads over which they are driven and the happenstance striking of damag-
ing objects.
See also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991, 995, 996 (Ala.
1981).
131 Cf. Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 582, 599-600, 326 A.2d 673, 682 (1974)
(plaintiff's failure either to prove that an accident was caused by an original defect in his car
or to negate other obvious possibilities required directed verdict for defendant).
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from a variety of causes, some going to manufacturing mistakes
and others to differing problems in design. Even a large number of
apparently similar product failures, therefore, does not mean that
the product line contains a single "defect," much less one that is
subject to feasible cure. 3 2
The relative number of the accidents also must be kept in
mind, even if they derive from identical problems in the product
itself. That perhaps some fifty persons, among the occupants of
several million Pintos, may have died in fire crashes over the last
decade is a tragic fact indeed,133 yet some fifty thousand people
die-and many more are injured-in traffic accidents in this nation
every year. 4 Principles of crashworthiness demand that automo-
bile manufacturers take all reasonable steps to reduce all known
and foreseeable risks as much as practicable,13 5 and a manufacturer
should be punished for flagrantly refusing to do so.""6 Yet the un-
happy fact remains that feasible technology simply does not exist
to reduce many such collision risks, and our society has opted more
or less to keep the automobile at approximately its present balance
of safety risks and related trade-offs-price, size, style, fuel effi-
ciency, and maneuverability. The collective decision has been
made that we cannot yet afford to be safety absolutists. 3 7 Thus
the tragic fact that dozens of people have died in Pinto fires over
the last decade should not mask the fact that thousands have died
in fire crashes in other subcompacts and larger vehicles over the
same period,3 3 reflecting the statistical inevitability of such acci-
13 The determination of the "similarity" of prior claims or accidents in these cases is
thus not as easy as it may first appear. The court in a recent gun explosion case remarked as
follows:
The purpose of the admission of prior occurrences to establish punitive damages in
products liability cases is to show that the manufacturer had or should have had
knowledge of harm inflicted on consumers by its product and with flagrant indifference
to public safety failed to warn consumers of or remedy the defect.... Guns are inher-
ently dangerous instrumentalities. The mere fact that other guns had exploded does
not, therefore, in and of itself support the existence of a defect.
Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 I1. App. 3d 1102, 1112, 427 N.E.2d 608, 615 (1981)
(company knew of 67 prior explosions of same model shotgun).
13 See TImE, Mar. 24, 1980, at 24.
134 The preliminary estimates for 1979 are as follows: deaths-51,083; disabling injury
accidents--450,000; injuries-3,830,000; police-reported traffic accidents-7,200,000. U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, MOTOR VEHICLE SAFETY-1979, at 2, 6 (1981).
3 See generally W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 412-31.
13 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 658 (5th Cir. 1981); Leichtamer
v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981).
'17 See, e.g., Johnson, The Perils of Risk Avoidance, REG., May/June 1980, at 15.
I It appears that some 500-1000 persons die from traffic accident fires in this nation
[49:1
19821 Punitive Damages
dents in general under prevailing levels of technology, wealth, and
social preference. 139
It is also important to view the number of complaints and law-
suits concerning a product in the context of the total number of
products sold and in use, the frequency of the product's use, and
the particular product's inherent dangers. Thus, it must be ex-
pected that virtually all manufacturers of mass-produced goods
that are inherently dangerous-automobiles, tires, drugs, chemi-
cals, or firearms-will be the targets of many complaints and law-
suits every year. 140 Reports of possible defects must of course be
investigated to see if there really is a problem with the product
and, if so, whether feasible curative measures can be found.14 1 For
the many reasons discussed above, however, the fact that a manu-
facturer is shown to have received a number of complaints or to
have been the target of previous lawsuits can only be the first step
in proving a punitive damages claim.
2. Violation of Safety Standards. If a manufacturer know-
ingly chooses to violate the safety practices of its industry, it will
bear a heavy burden to demonstrate the good faith of that deci-
sion. For example, in Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc.,142
the fourteen-year-old plaintiff was injured severely when struck in
the head by the arm of an automatic baseball pitching machine
manufactured by the defendant.1 43 The machine was unplugged at
each year. A widely publicized 1973 Department of Transportation estimate of 2000-3500
annual fatalities appears to have been substantially in error. See P. CooLEY, FIRE IN MOTOR
VEHICLE AccmamENs 59-60 (Highway Safety Research Inst., U. Mich., Apr. 1974) (actual
number estimated between 450-650); Flora & O'Day, An Estimate of the Effect of FMVSS
301-Fuel System Integrity, 13 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVN'ION 117 (1981) (1976-814
auto fire deaths; 1977-982). See generally Investigative Report, MOTOR TREND, Mar. 1974,
at 84-86.
Statistics from the mid-1970's show that the Pinto fire-fatality rate was within the
norm for subcompacts. See Defendant's Exhibit EE, State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324
(Super Ct. Elkhart Cty., Ind., Sept. 13, 1978) (setting forth National Highway Transporta-
tion Safety Administration's Fatal Accident Reporting System data for post-1970 cars in
fatal fire accidents, per million cars in operation, for 1975 & 1976: all vehicles-- 6.8; all
compacts- 7.3; Pinto- 7.0; VW- 9.3; Vega- 7.0; Datsun- 9.7; Toyota- 4.9; Gremlin-
9.8; Dodge Colt- 5.3; Opel- 8.8; Honda- 11.1).
'31 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 76, at 148-49 (commenting on inappropriateness of
finding "intent" where there is merely statistical inevitability of accidental injury).
'40 See W. KETON, supra note 49, at 1-16. Ford Motor Company, which has hundreds
of products liability lawsuits filed against it each year, see note 258 infra, is probably typical
in this respect, at least of automobile manufacturers.
141 See text and note at note 162 infra.
1 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980).
143 Id. at 139-40, 293 N.W.2d at 899.
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the time of the accident, but the arm had been left in an "ener-
gized" (cocked) position. Affirming the jury's award of punitive
damages,""' the Wisconsin Supreme Court pointed in part to the
defendant's failure to attach safety guards it knew were used on its
competitors' machines.145 Violations of government safety statutes
or regulations also undercut claims of good faith. 46 In some in-
stances, however, such regulations may be unnecessarily stringent,
and the common practice consequently may be to ignore them.
14
7
Yet, the burden clearly to demonstrate a standard's inappropriate-
ness should fall upon the manufacturer.
3. Ready Availability of Inexpensive Remedies. An impor-
tant aggravating factor in some cases is the manufacturer's aware-
ness of an easy solution to the problem plainly demanded by its
simplicity and economy. 48 The Grimshaw court thus was im-
pressed that there were a variety of "inexpensive fixes," each cost-
ing only several dollars, that supposedly could have solved the
Pinto's gas tank problem.149
144 The punitive damages awarded totalled $70,000, an amount described by the court
as "modest indeed." Id. at 156, 293 N.W.2d at 907.
'" Id. at 153-54, 293 N.W.2d at 906. See also Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650,
655-56 (5th Cir. 1981); Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 106 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720,
727 (Ark. 1981) (Hickman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
14 See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 1335-39.
147 See, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 238, 71 Cal Rptr.
306, 311 (1968); cf. American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981) (Cowart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (describing engineers' reluctant
decision to comply with government standards which they regarded as inappropriate for
"real world conditions").
148 See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 107 n.3 (6th Cir. 1975) (change in
high voltage transformer materials at cost of $0.60-1.20 per color television unit), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 155,
293 N.W.2d 897, 906-07 (1980) (addition of safety guard to automatic pitching machine).
149 Design changes that would have enhanced the integrity of the fuel tank system at
relatively little cost per car included the following:. Longitudinal side members and
cross members at $2.40 and $1.80, respectively;, a single shock absorbent "flak suit" to
protect the tank at $4; a tank within a tank and placement of the tank over the axle at
$5.08 to $5.79; a nylon bladder within the tank at $5.25 to $8; placement of the tank
over the axle surrounded with a protective barrier at a cost of $9.95 per car; substitu-
tion of a rear axle with a smooth differential housing at a cost of $2.10; imposition of a
protective shield between the differential housing and the tank at $2.35; improvement
and reenforcement of the bumper at $2.60; addition of eight inches of crush space [at]
a cost of $6.40. Equipping the car with a reinforced rear structure, smooth axle, im-
proved bumper and additional crush space at a total cost of $15.30 would have made
the fuel tank safe in a 34 to 38-mile-per-hour rear end collision by a vehicle the size of
a Ford Galaxie. If, in addition to the foregoing, a bladder or tank within a tank were
used or if the tank were protected with a shield, it would have been safe in a 40 to 45-
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A court must be wary of three pitfalls, however. First, the in-
expensive remedy factor is only one among the several that must
be present in combination to establish flagrant misconduct.150
Thus, without proof of a serious hazard clearly calling for atten-
tion, evidence of the availability of safer procedures that are sim-
ple and inexpensive simply has no force. 151 Second, any design al-
ternative advanced by the plaintiff must of course be likely to have
prevented his harm, or he will fail on the causation aspect of his
case.1 52 Third, courts and juries must be certain that any "cheap
fixes" proposed by plaintiff's experts were in fact feasible, availa-
ble, and economical in the industry at the time. In many indus-
tries, most qualified design experts are employed by the manufac-
turers;1 53 the credentials and alternative design theories of many
plaintiffs' experts should therefore be examined with special
scrutiny.'"
One must be somewhat skeptical of the Grimshaw court's
heavy reliance on an array of purported "cheap fixes," some of
which may not have been feasible at all. For example, the court
appeared to be impressed with the concept of adding a rubber or
nylon bladder to the inside of the gas tank. 55 Yet such bladders
apparently are still not generally used in commercially produced
cars; one thus must wonder whether they are feasible even today1'
mile-per-hour rear impact. If the tank had been located over the rear axle, it would
have been safe in a rear impact at 50 miles per hour or more.
119 Cal. App. 3d at 775-76, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361 (reciting the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment below).
150 See note 120 supra.
151 See American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 117, 412 A.2d 407,
420 (1980):
The only evidence offered in support of [plaintiff's] entitlement to punitive damages in
this case was ... failure to use the patented cut-off device and failure to warn of the
danger ....
Wanton and reckless conduct... requires, in this context, direct evidence of sub-
stantial knowledge on the part of the manufacturer that the product is, or is likely to
become, dangerous, and a gross indifference to the danger. Such evidence simply does
not exist in this case.
See also Newding v. Kroger Co., 554 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
155 See text and note at note 197 infra.
153 See, e.g., statistics for mechanical engineers cited in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 351 (1978-79 ed.).
'" See, e.g., Singleton v. International Harvester Co., No. 80-1445 (4th Cir. May 13,
1981). See generally W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 58, 882; O'Donnell, Design Litigation
and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 627, 646-61
(1978).
155 119 Cal. App. 3d at 775, 776, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 360, 361.
' "Moreover, fuel bladders, as appealing as their usage may be given their apparent
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or, if they are, whether they would do much good. Similar
problems of feasibility are raised by the court's reliance on testi-
mony that an over-the-axle location of the fuel tank would have
been a preferable design, because such a tank apparently cannot be
built into a small hatchback car such as the model of Pinto in-
volved in Grimshaw.
157
Apart from problems with the practicality of a proposed reme-
dial design in light of available technology and the environment of
the product's use, the monetary cost of such alternatives must also
be given careful thought. In a complex product such as a car, there
are always hundreds of design changes that can be made to en-
hance the safety of the vehicle in a particular type of a crash situa-
tion, ranging in cost per unit from pennies to hundreds of dol-
lars.158 Although the cost of any one change may be small in
isolation, all we can fairly ask of management and its engineers in
the punitive damages context is that safety considerations not be
deliberately excluded or shunted far to the rear in deciding on the
total design mix involved. Each separate design choice is of course
only a small sub-decision in the overall safety-cost-utility mix that
must be tailored to the special needs and limitations of each differ-
ent type of product. 59
Moreover, the frailties of the engineering art are such that
simplicity of manufacture, have not been used in tanks in any of the millions of automobiles
now on the road." Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 963-64 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
General Motors did install flexible, rubber fuel bladders in the Corvette from 1975-77
but switched to a molded plastic liner in 1978. Telephone interview with Frank W. Allen,
Asst. Gen. Counsel, Gen. Motors Corp. (Feb. 1, 1982). See also Letter from John P. Eppel,
Asst. Gen. Counsel, Ford Motor Co., to David G. Owen, app. (October 22, 1981) (noting
problems of bladder durability and serviceability) (on file with The University of Chicago
Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Eppel Letter]; interview with John P. Eppel in Dearborn,
Mich. (July 9, 1981).
167 Reply Brief and Cross-Respondent's Brief of Ford Motor Co. at 4, Grimshaw.
I" Consider the remarks of Judge Cowart, concurring in part and dissenting in part in
American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981):
The majority states that failure to build to a safer design "in order to maximize prof-
its" should support an award of punitive damages here. Any product, especially an
automobile, can always be redesigned to increase user safety. However, increases in
safety necessitate increases in cost; a perfectly safe automobile would be unaffordable.
Therefore, in order to retain a salable product, the manufacturer is always forced to
reduce the safety of the design by some amount from the ideal. Therefore, for any
given product, the manufacturer will always have failed to make the product safer be-
cause of considerations of profit. Such practical economic considerations are not at all
wrongful, much less malicious.
1I" See text and note at note 111 supra.
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some good-faith errors sometimes will be made, and injuries some-
times will result. In a products liability case seeking compensation
for such injuries, a principal inquiry will be to isolate the design
choice that could have prevented the injury and to focus on its
cost. Although the cost of such a single "fix" will often seem quite
low in absolute terms, we must not lose sight of the facts that at
the time of design, the fix was merely one of a great many options
considered for inclusion in the total design mix, and that human
injury from any one was at most at that time only a foreseeable
risk. To pin a bad-faith label on whichever one of these decisions
years later proves to have been wrong thus should require much
more than proof that the cost of the particular fix was "small."
4. Corporate Policies and Procedures. Our society has now
reached the stage where we demand that manufacturers of inher-
ently dangerous products institutionalize procedures for minimiz-
ing and correcting hazards in their products."" A total absence or
palpable inadequacy of regular safety procedures demonstrates an
indifference to consumer safety.161 The expenditure of only paltry
sums on research into flame retardants by a manufacturer of high-
ly flammable cotton flannelette for use in children's nightwear is
evidence of this type.'62 Insufficient crash-testing of a vehicle also
has been cited in this regard,163 and one recent case has pointed to
the manufacturer's failure to have in place a "formal safety review
committee" that probably would have detected and eliminated the
hazard.1 6
4
160 Reasonable attention to safety normally includes, at a minimum, premarketing engi-
neering studies and prototype testing, assembly line quality controls, consideration of ap-
propriate warnings and instructions, and field performance monitoring and response.
"I Evidence of this type of "passive" indifference to consumer safety was the principal
basis of the dissenting opinion in Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 623 F.2d 395, 404 (5th Cir.)
(Johnson, J., dissenting) (citing defendant's failure to crash-test its truck tractors and to
stay abreast of accident statistics and engineering developments), rehearing en banc
granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980). See also text and note at note 74 supra.
16 Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 740 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
921 (1980). The court pointed to the defendant's "minimal" efforts in its "surveillance of
developments in the flame-retardant field," noted that it had "kept no records on its re-
search and development" on flammability prevention, and remarked that from 1967 to 1969,
the company had spent but $140,000 on this type of research out of its total research and
development budget of $1.8 million. Id.
"' Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981). A manufac-
turer must not be expected, however, to conduct crash experiments to test the durability of
its vehicles in all the myriad contexts in which crashes can occur. Such tests are expensive,
typically costing roughly $10,000 plus the cost of the vehicle. See Eppel Letter, supra note
156, at 2.
I" Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 153, 293 N.E.2d 897, 906
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C. Matters of Defense and Mitigation
Just as the courts have indicated circumstances of aggravation
tending to demonstrate flagrant misconduct, so also have they
pointed to mitigating circumstances cutting against the award of
punitive damages. As a general principle, proof of an absence or
converse of the aggravating factors discussed above tends to prove
good faith. For example, the absence or low number of prior com-
plaints tends to support a manufacturer's claim of ignorance of a
problem in need of attention,8 5 and the routine use of bona fide
safety procedures ordinarily should protect the manufacturer
against punitive damages when the procedures sometimes fail. And
if the defendant can show that its management is new and has
purged the enterprise of the prior misconduct, the punitive dam-
ages case is weakened substantially."'
Two broad contexts of mitigation deserve special attention:
those going to the defectiveness vel non of the product and those
going to the causal circumstances of the accident apart from the
product itself.
1. Product Defectiveness. a. In general. There can be no lia-
bility, of course, either for compensatory or for punitive damages if
the product is not legally defective in the first place. However dan-
gerous a product may be, and however many injuries may be asso-
ciated with it, the manufacturer cannot be held liable if the prod-
uct was not in fact "defective." This is what courts mean when
they note that manufacturers are not held to be insurers of prod-
uct safety or insurers against product accidents.8 7 To most courts,
this means that there is no liability for legal defectiveness unless
(1) there was an error in the manufacture of the product, (2) the
(1980).
265 See, e.g., Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536 F.2d 645, 651 (6th Cir. 1976) (three
prior claims concerning risks from inhaling carbon monoxide fumes from charcoal briquets
burned indoors); Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 266 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (no prior reports of electrical burns to cornea of eye from electrical arcing on
eyepiece of surgical telescopic instrument); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 II1. App. 3d 678,
686, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1086 (1981) (six tractor roll-overs in ten years); American Laundry
Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 117, 412 A.2d 407, 420 (1980) (no complaints of
extractors disintegrating in 18 years).
1" See Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 366 (6th Cir. 1978), af'g 395 F.
Supp. 1081, 1098 (N.D. Ohio 1975). But cf. Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97
Wis. 2d 136, 154-56, 293 N.W.2d 897, 906-07 (1980) (new owner retained old management
and was aware of safety hazards).
167 See, e.g., Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 M11. App. 3d 678, 687, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1086
(1981) (quoting Hunt v. Blasius, 74 IM. 2d 203, 211-12, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978)).
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product's safety was affirmatively misrepresented, (3) the injury
results from a hidden or otherwise unexpected danger, or (4) the
manufacturer failed to apply identifiable preventive measures that
were feasible and cost-effective. In short, there must have been
something "wrong" with the product that caused the plaintiff's in-
juries before there can be liability for that harm.' s
Although defects (1) and (2) are typically apparent to the
manufacturer, and thus, their deliberate creation often flagrantly
improper, the design and warnings "defect" notions of (3) and (4)
are surrounded by shrouds of mist. The mist exists, of course, only
in the middle of the spectrum, and cases do arise at either extreme,
where the product is clearly defective or not. Yet for the great
number of cases in the middle, the legal "tests" of liability for such
defects are by their nature so vague that they are often effectively
meaningless as guides for design engineers attempting to comply
with the law.16 9 There is therefore a vast defect "no man's land"
where a manufacturer has no idea whether it is on the right or
wrong side of the law. One indeed may ask whether "law" itself
exists in such terrain, or whether "lawless" is the better word to
describe the prevailing "rule" of random guilt.17 0 The very notion
of how much design safety is enough, and to a lesser extent how
much safety information is enough, involves a morass of concep-
tual, political, and practical issues on which juries, courts, com-
mentators, and legislatures strongly disagree.'71 But because al-
1 See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 402(A)(1) & comments g & h.
2" See generally Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A
Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 625 (1978); O'Donnell, supra note 86.
170 Cf. Rabin, Dealing with Disasters: Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal
System, 30 STAN. L. REv. 281, 297 (1978), commenting on the task of the plaintiffs' lawyer
in the 1972 Buffalo Creek flood disaster case:
Unfortunately, the distinction between recklessness and negligence relates to no
clear behavioral standards in the real world. Baldly stated, Stem's task was to amass
sufficient evidence of negligence to make the defendants look "awfully negligent," and
his success at trial almost certainly would have turned on the jury's emotional reaction
to the victims' suffering.
It is truly striking how we have devised a system that is not far removed from a
lottery for deciding such grave matters-with the draw determined by not only the
predilections of the presiding judge, but the emotions of the jury sitting in the case.
171 Where the courts themselves are in disagreement on whether a particular type of
product danger should give rise to liability even for compensatory damages, the imposition
of punitive damages upon a manufacturer on the basis of that danger would seem particu-
larly inappropriate in most cases. For example, for machines where certain types of safety
features are often offered as optional features, a manufacturer's failure to incorporate the
feature as standard equipment generally should preclude an award of punitive damages. Cf.
Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 Il1. App. 3d 678, 683, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (1981) (seat belt
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most all agree that perfect safety cannot yet be our legal goal,
design engineers simply must continue to make the best judgments
that they can on the balance of trade-offs between safety, utility,
and cost-the incommensurable components of "defectiveness."
For defect types (3) and (4), there probably cannot in the na-
ture of things be a bright line separating good products from bad
to guide the engineer or the judicial forum reviewing his work
years hence. In the defect "no man's land," punitive damages sim-
ply have no place. 17 2 If such decisions fall within any reasonable
distance of the "defect line," even if in hindsight proven wrong,
fairness requires that they ordinarily be judged to have been made
in good faith. Stated in another way, even if the product is finally
found "defective," the case for punitive damages almost always
will be quite weak if a plausible case for nondefectiveness was
made the other way. Such damages usually will not be appropriate
unless the product was very defective, and plainly so, at the time it
was sold.17 - A plaintiff usually should be entitled to a directed ver-
dict on defectiveness, or close thereto, before the punitive damages
issue is properly before the jury at all.174
b. Obvious or known dangers. If a danger is obvious or
known to the user, there of course is no duty to warn. 5 In design
cases, however, the "patent danger" rule has now been repudiated
for the most part as a basis for directed verdicts against plain-
tiffs,176 and there usually is a duty to design such dangers out of
the product if it is feasible and economical to do so.177 Yet the
better-reasoned decisions generally retain obviousness or knowl-
edge of the hazard within the design defectiveness equation as one
of several factors to be considered. 78
and roll-bar package supplied as optional equipment).
172 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 76, at 136 (noting inappropriateness of punitive
damages in situations where it is difficult to distinguish good acts from bad).
173 Cf. id. at 137 (case 4a) (noting inappropriateness of punitive damages for unreasona-
ble but honest mistakes). See also text and note at note 124 supra.
174 See text at notes 107-109 supra.
"0 See, e.g., Forest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Ark.
1981). A few ill-considered opinions are to the contrary. See generally W. KmnTON, supra
note 49, at 337 n.8.
174 See W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 399-408.
7 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 43-44 (Alaska 1979), on rehear-
ing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980). But cf. McIntyre v. Everest & Jinnings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 159
(8th Cir.) (no duty to warn paraplegic plaintiff of obvious dangers of tipping movable com-
mode), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978).
178 See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976).
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In the context of a claim for punitive damages, the principles
generally track along a similar path, yet the obviousness of the
danger should offer somewhat more protection to the manufac-
turer. Although the obviousness of a danger should not shield him
in every type of case, it often reduces the chance of injury and
shifts to the consumer the final choice of whether and how to en-
gage the risk. Because the consumer can control his fate, the man-
ufacturer of "defective" products of this type ordinarily is not
nearly so much to blame as when the existence or nature of the
risk is concealed from view.1"9
For example, in Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day1s0 where the
plaintiff shot himself in the leg when he dropped a loaded gun, he
surely knew of the obvious risk of discharge in such an event.
Moreover, the manufacturer had given at least some warnings and
instructions on the specific risk involved-the possibility of acci-
dental discharge when the hammer was placed in a partially loaded
position.181 Although the Alaska Supreme Court was not convinced
that the manufacturer should therefore be relieved of the jury's
punitive damages verdict altogether, it did reduce the amount
awarded many fold.18
Cases in which a substantial danger is unknown or uncompre-
hended by the consumer, who to that extent has no control over
his safety welfare, are to be contrasted. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp.,158 where the young girl's burns resulted from the "racing
flammability ' " of her nightgown's fabric, is one such case; so too
179 The autonomy of individuals in obvious danger cases is generally not at stake, while
the group interest in cost-efficiency may be promoted in such cases by a no-liability rule.
See the discussion and authorities cited supra note 97.
1"0 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980).
181 In particular, the risk occurred when the hammer was placed on the loading notch.
Id. at 41, 43.
2 The permissible award was reduced on the first appeal from the $2.9 million verdict
to $250,000, 594 P.2d at 48-49, yet was increased to $500,000 on the second appeal, 615 P.2d
at 624. See also McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155, 159-60 (8th Cir.) (risk
to paraplegic of tipping over commode chair from leaning forward to pick up toothbrush),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 616 S.W.2d
720, 724 (Ark. 1981) (risk of injury if pants leg caught in unguarded power take-off shaft on
tractor). One also might think that the general collision risks to occupants of a subcompact
Honda automobile similarly would be so apparent as to preclude a finding of "malice" in
design. A district court's holding to this effect was reversed on appeal, however, and the
punitive damages verdict for $5 million reinstated, in Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d
650 (5th Cir. 1981).
181 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 921 (1980).
18 Id. at 733.
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is the Wussow 85 case, where the boy could have had no idea that
bumping the arm of the unplugged pitching machine would cause
the arm to strike his head with explosive force.186 Grimshaw may
also involve this factor to a large extent, for the risk of being
burned to death while trapped inside a car is an insidious hazard
not to be expected from a low-impact collision from the rear. A
manufacturer's deliberate refusal to apply simple, curative mea-
sures to resolve such hidden dangers-and its refusal to warn of
them-involves a moral failure of a considerably greater dimension
than a failure to repair a danger that is open for all to see. 187
c. Compliance with industry custom. It is well established
that compliance with custom is relevant but not conclusive evi-
dence of due care in an action based on negligence. 18s Although
compliance with custom is less relevant to the defect question in
strict liability,1 89 it properly has been accorded substantial weight
in the punitive damages context. In Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.,1 90
the decisive factor in the trial court's decision to set aside the
jury's $10 million punitive damages assessment was the fact that
the design of the fuel system on the defendant's truck tractor fol-
lowed the prevailing industry design in all material respects. 91
In a typical case, compliance with a universal industry custom
should be held conclusively to establish good faith against a puni-
tive damages claim. Rarely will an entire industry act with flagrant
impropriety against the health and safety of the consuming public,
185 Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 293 N.W.2d 897 (1980).
186 Id. at 140, 293 N.W.2d at 899.
167 The deliberate refusal to warn persons known to need vital safety information has
an appearance of fraud by nondisclosure. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 551(2)(e). As
has been noted, see text and note at note 122 supra, punitive damages are especially appro-
priate in cases involving fraud. "Typical" warnings cases, however, rarely appear to involve
flagrant misbehavior. The reason for this is a difficult question, but it probably reflects the
growing skepticism of the efficacy of warnings.
188 See W. KFETON, supra note 49, at 59 n.4.
188 See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 45 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615
P.2d 621 (1980).
190 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc
granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
191 Two of three judges on appeal agreed. 623 F.2d at 399. The dissenting judge argued
that "[i]ndustry custom will frequently be an excuse for doing nothing," observing that
"[i]ndustry custom may well deter safe product design. It can embody and preserve con-
scious disregard for the welfare of others." Id. at 405 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted). See also Drayton v. Jiffee Chem. Corp., 591 F.2d 352, 374 (6th Cir. 1978) (Keith,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If an entire industry monolithically markets
a dangerous product instead of competing to make a safer product, the deterrent effect of
punitive damages is vitally needed.").
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and running with the pack in general should shield a manufacturer
from later punishment for conforming to the norm. There may be
rare cases, however, as the Gryc flammability case may have
been,192 where an entire industry failed in a major way to respond
with even minimal responsibility to a serious consumer risk. For
this reason, compliance with an industry custom probably should
not be an absolute defense to a punitive damages claim in every
case.
d. Compliance with statute or regulation. The principles
pertaining to the effect of compliance with a statutory or regula-
tory safety standard are quite similar to those concerning custom.
Such standards usually establish only a minimum floor, however,
below which conduct is criminal; the acceptable safety level thus
may be considerably higher.193 In such cases, therefore, a manufac-
turer should not be protected automatically from punitive damages
by establishing its compliance with government safety provisions.
This is what the Gryc court held, ruling that the fabric manufac-
turer could not defend itself conclusively from punitive damages
by proving its compliance with a government regulation widely
known to be far too lax to have any real protective effect.,,
Many government standards, however, are adopted with
studied care, and some are placed close to the line of feasible tech-
nology;1 95 others are set in a wide gray area where the difficulties of
"I See text and notes at notes 162, 183-184 supra. Apparently no American manufac-
turers were flame-retarding cotton flannelette at the time, although manufacturers in Eng-
land had been flame-retarding similar sleepwear as required by law for a decade. 297
N.W.2d at 731.
is' This is the reason commonly given for why liability for compensatory damages
should not be barred conclusively on proof of compliance with a governmental safety stan-
dard. See generally W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 296-304, 365-73.
1" 297 N.W.2d at 733-35. Commentators have noted:
The Flammable Fabrics Act, originally enacted in 1953, and amended in 1967, has been
the subject of substantial criticism, basically on the ground that its standards are far
too low to be of any real value to the consumer. For example, the government itself
reported in 1970 that every one of the 230 garments recovered from 159 burn case
studies involving 17 deaths passed the prevailing test for rapid and intense burning.
Plaintiffs' experts regularly argue, and sometimes prove, that even ordinary toilet pa-
per or newspaper will pass this test.
W. KaroN, supra note 49, at 373.
"I See generally Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); UNI-
FORM PRODUCT LLk~mrry LAw § 107 and analysis (U.S. Dep't of Commerce Draft 1979),
reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 3007-08 (1979). The approach to this issue in the final draft is
different. See MODEL UMFORM PRODUCT LIABHmrry ACT § 108 and analysis (U.S. Dep't of
Commerce 1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,730-31 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
MUPLA].
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defining defectiveness (the "proper" mix of safety and its trade-
offs) are especially great.1"' In these circumstances, particularly if
many in the industry have come to treat the provision as the
proper safety norm, proof of compliance with the regulation or
statute ordinarily should be deemed to be conclusive proof of good
faith and hence a conclusive defense to a punitive damages claim.
2. Causal Factors Apart from Defect. a. In general. It is
axiomatic that a manufacturer will not be held liable for losses
that it did not cause, whether or not it sold the product in flagrant
disregard of its dangers. If the plaintiff's injury is not fairly tracea-
ble to the alleged product defect, there can be no liability for dam-
ages of any type.197 If the injury results from a combination of a
defect and serious product abuse by the plaintiff or someone else,
however, the problem becomes much more difficult.
b. Product misuse and contributory fault. The real world
environment into which products are sold informs the manufac-
turer that they will be subjected to occasional and moderate abuse,
and warning and design choices must reflect such expectable
events. 98 Yet most persons are not prepared to pay the high price
that would result if the law required that products be designed to
withstand the most severe abuse; probably most would rather pay
lower prices and shoulder the responsibility for this class of risks
themselves.1 99 Thus, where a product fails from substantial abuse,
the cause of the accident usually is deemed to be "unforeseeable,"
2" Many automobile safety regulations imposed by the National Highway Transporta-
tion Safety Administration ("NHTSA") are probably of this type. For this reason, even the
deliberate reduction in safety to the minimum level required in a newly-adopted safety
standard of this type should be considered acceptable behavior in most cases. Evidence that
Chrysler "manufactured down" to new 30 m.p.h. rear crash-test standards that NHTSA
adopted in 1976, however, apparently was influential in a jury's decision to assess $3 million
in punitive damages against the company for its design of the 1977 Volare's fuel system. See
Fort Lauderdale News & Sun-Sentinel, Aug. 29, 1981.
1 See Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 Ill. App. 3d 678, 687, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1087
(1981). See also Sabich v. Outboard Marine Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 703, 706 (1976) ("It is
inconceivable that anyone should be held civilly liable for an injury which he did not cause,
whether he be charged with negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or conduct giving rise to
absolute liability."), cause dismissed by stipulation, 60 Cal. App. 3d 591 (1977). See gener-
ally Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. CoLo. L. REv. 153, 163
(1976); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on Rules of Liability
and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. Rav. 769, 777-87 (1977).
198 See generally W. KE N, supra note 49, at 338-46, 408-24; Note, Overuse in Prod-
ucts Liability, 57 NEB. L. REv. 817 (1978).
I" Cf. Owen, supra note 31, at 714 (noting "the apparent unfairness of forcing manu-




and the manufacturer is relieved of responsibility.200 An alternate
approach, at least in cases where it is the plaintiff who has abused
the product, is to find his conduct to have been the "sole proxi-
mate cause" of the accident. 0 1 The equities are different, however,
and the proper resolution less clear, when the plaintiff's injury is
traceable beyond a product defect to some flagrant misbehavior by
the manufacturer.
The classic doctrinal resolution of the problem in compensa-
tory damages cases involving reckless misconduct by the defendant
was to hold him liable for the results of the plaintiff's negligent,
but not reckless, contributory misbehavior.2 2 Whether this general
doctrine should prevail in the punitive damages context is difficult
to say. The trend in compensatory damages cases is toward a com-
parative apportionment of fault and damages and away from the
all-or-nothing principles of former times.2 03 Yet even under sys-
tems of pure comparative fault, a sole proximate cause defense
probably should be retained as a total bar to punitive damages in
certain situations of extreme consumer fault.21  Where the plaintiff
plainly brought the accident upon himself by recklessly throwing
himself into the arms of danger, punishing the defendant on top of
awarding'the plaintiff reduced compensatory damages often seems
oddly out of place.20 5 This is particularly true in cases where the
200 See, e.g., Hegwood v. General Motors Corp., 286 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Iowa 1979) (tire
blowout at 110-120 m.p.h.). See note 198 supra.
201 See, e.g., Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 628 F.2d 891, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1980); Mc-
Carty v. F.C. Kingston Co., 22 Ariz. App. 17, 18, 522 P.2d 778, 779 (1974).
11" See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 503(1); Landes & Posner, supra note 76, at 134
(arguing that the rule generally is efficient). See also Owen, supra note 197, at 787-93. As-
sumption of risk is also classically held to bar recovery for even reckless misconduct, see id.
at 789-91. This defense usually arises in cases of obvious dangers, see Vargus v. Pitman Mfg.
Co., 510 F. Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1981), which have been addressed above. See text and
notes at notes 175-187 supra.
103 See generally V. SCHWARTZ, ComPArAIvE NEGLIGENCE (1974). Some limitations of
the comparative fault doctrine are examined in Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Compara-
tive Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND. L. R.v. 797 (1977); Walkowiak, Reconsidering
Plaintiff's Fault in Product Liability Litigation: The Proposed Conscious Design Choice
Exception, 33 VA ir. L. Rav. 651 (1980).
'" See Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 628 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980); V. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 203, § 4.4, at 91. Cf. MUPLA, supra note 195, § 120(B)(8) & analysis (providing for the
reduction of such damages where "the harm suffered by the claimant was also the result of
the claimant's own reckless disregard for personal safety"), reprinted in 44 FED. PEG. at
62,748-49.
205 Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621
(1980), leaves me with this impression, as does Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp.
566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), rev'd in part, No. 79-1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981). Even where the
plaintiff seriously and consciously misbehaves, however, punitive damages may be appropri-
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product was not clearly and palpably defective and where the man-
ufacturer's bad faith is not plainly evident (the "close call" cases);
in situations such as these, the reckless misconduct of the plaintiff
reinforces the preclusion of punitive damages in any amount.
Where the misconduct of both the manufacturer and the user is
clearly flagrant and extreme, however, and the causal connection is
fairly traceable to both in substantial measure, it may be that a
moderate award of punitive damages-perhaps limited to an
amount approximating attorneys' fees and other costs of litiga-
tion 2 -- would be in order.
IV. PROBLEMS OF MEASUREMENT AND CONTROL
A. Method and Problems of Measurement
The amount of punitive damages generally is determined by
the jury upon a consideration of three factors: the degree of repre-
hensibility of the defendant's misconduct, the nature and extent of
the plaintiff's injury, and the amount of the defendant's wealth.0 7
Ostensibly because of the jury's role as the conscience of the com-
munity, yet in fact largely because of the impossibility for reasoned
judicial review of such a vague issue as reprehensibility, most
courts purport to vest the jury with wide discretion in determining
the amount of punishment.2 8 In practice, however, especially in
cases against institutional defendants, there appears to be a grow-
ing trend to subject such awards to greater judicial scrutiny.20°
ate in cases of truly intentional wrongdoing by the manufacturer, as in many cases of fraud.
208 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908 comment f.
207 "In short, crassness of conduct may govern the amount of award commensurate with
a defendant's financial ability." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 591 (W.D.
Okla. 1979), rev'd in part on other grounds, No. 79-1894 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1981). See text
and note at note 44 supra.
2 '08 See Armstrong v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp., 631 F.2d 1344, 1353 (8th Cir.
1980) (" 'matter of punitive damages is so "purely and peculiarly one for the jury's discre-
tion" that only in an extreme case will the appellate court interfere' ") (quoting Hoene v.
Associated Dry Goods Corp., 487 S.W.2d 479, 486 (Mo. 1972)); cf. Maxey v. Freightliner
Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 966 _(N.D. Tex. 1978) ("This court will not substitute its judgment
for the jury's."), af'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008
(5th Cir. 1980).
2, Despite the observation of the Maxey court, see note 208 supra, it did in fact strike
the jury's $10 million award altogether. 450 F. Supp. at 964. See also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v.
Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979) (reducing $2.9 million jury award to $250,000 and ob-
serving that "judicial scrutiny over the awards provides a partial justification for allowing
such awards in the first place. The spectre of bankruptcy and excessive punishment can be
in part dispelled to the extent that trial and appellate courts exercise their powers of re-
view."), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298,
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The general principles of measurement and jury discretion de-
scribed above have tended to work satisfactorily in most tradi-
tional contexts in which punitive damages have been awarded,
such as those involving fraud, conversion, assault, defamation, se-
duction, and trespass. When one person deprives another of his
rights in one of these contexts, the jury is usually a good gauge of
the community's pulse on whether the defendant acted with malice
or reckless abandon, whether the misconduct requires punishment
in addition to the payment of compensatory damages and, if so,
the amount of punitive damages necessary to serve both as an ap-
propriate punishment to the offender and as an example to others.
Especially in former times, when jurors were selected because of
their familiarity with the parties and the facts of the particular
dispute, 10 their intuitive sense of how great a need existed for fur-
ther "justice" than the law permitted through compensatory dam-
ages was well suited to the situation.211 The limited wealth of most
human defendants usually provided a sufficient cap for such
awards, which in today's dollars might reach at a maximum several
thousand dollars-enough to make a major dent in the net worth
of all but the most wealthy malefactor.
Such is not the state of affairs today, however, in products lia-
bility actions against major manufacturers. The jurors, of course,
can know little of the dispute, and the plaintiff's lawyer often will
seek to include on the jury only persons who know very little about
how corporate enterprises really function. Few if any of the jurors
will have any firm idea of what the manufacturer's financial sheet
figures really mean212 or of what effect a certain level of punitive
damages will have on the financial and operating affairs of the
enterprise.
Added to this threshold problem is the fact that "wealth" no
longer serves as a clearly limiting factor on the range of jury dis-
cretion. Instead, a jury instructed to use the "wealth" of a multi-
million or multi-billion dollar corporation as a yardstick in assess-
294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980) ("We believe [that] judicial controls .. will provide for fair
administration of punitive damage awards in this state."). See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35,
§ 908 comment f ("In many states there has been a tightening of control by the appellate
courts over discretion of the trier of fact.").
210 See generally Hassett, A Jury's Pre-Trial Knowledge in Historical Perspective: The
Distinction Between Pre-Trial Information and "Prejudicial" Publicity, 43 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 155 (Autumn 1980).
'n See DuBois, supra note 33, at 347.
"' See text and notes at notes 89-92 supra.
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ing punitive damages is almost forced to think in terms of seven
figures, as did the jury in Sturm, Ruger,2 13 or eight figures, as in
the Maxey case,214 or even nine figures, as in Grimshaw2 15 After
all, how can a jury otherwise expect to make its punitive assess-
ment teach a meaningful lesson to a company "making" millions of
dollars every day? Thus, the former "capping" effect of wealth as a
yardstick, and even the very understanding of that concept, are
usually absent in the modern products liability case.210
Moreover, the notion of institutional culpability is very differ-
ent from that of human guilt. Although a jury might have a good
intuitive sense of the degree of moral blame that properly attaches
to a punch in the nose or to repeated trespasses over another's
land, the ideas of institutional responsibility and irresponsibility,
and the measurement of irresponsibility on a scale that at some
point reads "flagrant," involve complex political, philosophical,
and practical considerations that may reach beyond the ken of
many jurors.
217
'13 The amount of the jury's award was $2.9 million. 594 P.2d at 41.
2" The amount of the jury's award was $10 million. 450 F. Supp. at 957.
215 The amount of the jury's award was $125 million. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 174 Cal.
Rptr. at 358. Note the court's discussion of the asserted excessiveness of the remitted
amount of $3.5 million:
Nor was the reduced award excessive taking into account defendant's wealth and the
size of the compensatory award. Ford's net worth was $7.7 billion dollars and its in-
come after taxes for 1976 was over $983 million. The punitive award was approximately
.005 percent of Ford's net worth and approximately .03 percent of its 1976 net income.
Id. at 820, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
214 The problem is aggravated substantially in "mass disaster" cases where the manu-
facturer faces a multiplicity of punitive damages claims. See note 227 and text and note at
note 235 infra.
217 In fact, the study of corporate responsibility and culpability remains in its infancy
even among scholars of law and corporate behavior. Recent literature on point includes M.
CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME (1980); M. ERmANN & R. LuNDmAN, CORPORATE
AND GOVERNMENTAL DEVIANCE (1978); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a
Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV.
1099 (1977); Coffee, Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The Problems of Finding
an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as Making Punishment Fit]; Crane, Commentary: The Due Process Considerations in the
Imposition of Corporate Liability, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 39 (1980); Demsetz, Social Responsi-
bility in the Enterprise Economy, 10 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1978); Engel, An Approach to Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1979); Friedman, Some Reflections on the
Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 173 (1979); Stone, The Place of
Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1 (1980); White-
Collar Crime, 17 AM. CRim. L. REV. 409 (1980); Developments in the Law-Corporate
Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARv. L. REV. 1227
(1979); Note, Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 No-
TRE DAME LAW. 911 (1979) (discussing Indiana criminal prosecution of Ford for Pinto de-
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The problem, of course, is aggravated by the complexity of the
engineering choices lying behind the corporate acts. A rose is often
not a rose in such an environment, and what looks like acceptable
if not praiseworthy conduct to one person may look flagrantly im-
proper to another: one person's sound engineering is another per-
son's trading lives for profits.
Compounding these problems of comprehension and definition
is one of process. One of the classic words used in older cases to
describe the requisite misconduct for punitive damages was "out-
rageous,"21 a word still used on occasion even in products cases.21'
The word appears to imply that the jury must be enraged by the
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct before it may award puni-
tive damages at all. Because the amount of such an award is sup-
posed to increase with the degree of moral reprehensibility, the
amount presumably should increase in line with the jury's sense of
outrage. Carrying this reasoning to its conclusion, when a jury's
rage has been whipped into a frenzy, it is authorized to tax the
largest possible award of punitive damages-probably in an
amount just short of bankruptcy.
The problem is that, in theory at least, we require that our
tribunals render their decisions upon calm and disinterested reflec-
tion, free from emotion. Indeed, a common basis for reversal or
remittitur of a punitive damages award is a finding that it was
based on "passion or prejudice."220 The apparent paradox thus re-
sults that a punitive damages claim may not lie unless the jury is
outraged, yet if the jury is outraged its verdict must be reversed:
the standard of liability therefore appears to include the basis for
its own reversal.221 The paradox is in theory resolved by in-
structing jurors to remain dispassionate while finding outrage in
the defendant's acts, yet one may question how effectively the
average human mind can separate theoretical outrage from the
emotional kind.
sign); Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091
(1976).
21, See RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908(1).
"I See, e.g., American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457 (1980); Wussow
v. Commerical Mechanisms, Inc., 97 Wis. 2d 136, 154, 155, 293 N.W.2d 897, 906, 907 (1980).
120 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing,
615 P.2d 621, 624 (1980).
221 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1320 n.304.
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Perhaps the inherent "volatility 2   of the punitive damages
issue demonstrated by this paradox will require the adoption of
arbitrary limits to punitive damages awards against manufacturers
to keep such awards within reasonable bounds. One such approach
is the reasonable relationship or ratio test employed in many
states. 223 Most courts and many juries at least implicitly have been
using this approach, as demonstrated by the fact that the ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages approved on appeal in serious
injury or death cases of this type only rarely has exceeded 1.5 or
2:1.224 In Grimshaw, for example, the ratio (as remitted) was
1.4:1.25 Another control device would be to place an arbitrary dol-
lar limit on the amount of punitive damages awardable to any one
plaintiff. With the exception of Grimshaw, only one appellate
court in a products case has approved a punitive damages award to
a single plaintiff in excess of $1 million,22 and perhaps that
amount should generally be considered a natural cap for such
awards.227
212 See Georgie Boy Mfg., Inc. v. Superior Court, 115 Cal. App. 3d 217, 225, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 382, 386 (1981). Cf. In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir.) ("The fre-
quently violent and dramatic circumstances of accidents that lead to wrongful death actions
not only would pose this danger of extreme awards, but also might increase the temptation
for a jury to award punitive damages even when concrete elements of fraudulent or inten-
tional wrongdoing are absent."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980).
223 See Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 753, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237,
245 (1980) ("Without the reasonable relationship instruction, the discretion of the jury be-
comes simply limitless."), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 1051 (1981); text and note at note 45
supra. See also Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331 (5th Cir. 1981) (adopting
treble damages standard for determining excessiveness of punitive damages verdict in case
involving account "churning" by stockbroker); Coffee, Making Punishment Fit, supra note
217, at 29 (proposing "a treble damages formula as a partial substitute for the class action"
in "Pinto-type" litigation). See generally Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 303
n.26, 294 N.W.2d 437, 459 n.26 (1980).
224 See, e.g., Gillham v. Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 104 (6th Cir. 1975) (punitive dam-
ages, plus attorneys' fees, $150,000; compensatory damages, $125,000; ratio-1.2:1), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Minn.)
(punitive damages, $1 million; compensatory damages, $750,000; ratio-1.3:1), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 921 (1980); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 573 (Ohio 1981)
(combined punitive damages, $1.1 million; combined compensatory damages, $1.1 million;
ratio-1:1). But see Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1981) (punitive
damages, $5 million; combined compensatory damages, $825,000; ratio-6.1:1); Rinker v.
Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (punitive damages, $460,000;
compensatory damages, $100,000; ratio-4.6:1). By statute, Connecticut now limits punitive
damages in products cases to twice the plaintiff's actual damages. See note 247 infra.
2215 The remitted punitive damages were $3.5 million, the compensatory about $2.5 mil-
lion. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 771-72 & n.1, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358 & n.1.
228 Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 1981) ($5 million).
2217 This conclusion is buttressed by the apparent fact that the highest penalty author-
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At the very least, the "outrage" paradox requires courts to
scrutinize with special care punitive damages verdicts that look
high by any measure. Thus the Grimshaw trial court certainly was
correct in remitting the $125 million verdict by a very large pro-
portion. The court also would appear to have been acting well
within reason had it taken the further step of reversing completely
on the grounds of passion or prejudice;228 whether such a result
was appropriate on the facts is difficult to tell from the published
opinion. Perhaps the basic lesson from the outrage paradox is that
punitive damages awards walk a tight line of propriety vel non in
any type of case.229 In a products liability case against a corporate
manufacturer, the inherent juror bias, the complexities of the fac-
tual questions, and the vagueness of the legal standards create an
atmosphere especially ripe for an effective plaintiff's advocate to
stir the hearts and inflame the passions of any jury.230
ized by statute for breach of the criminal law is $1 million. Cf. Coffee, Making Punishment
Fit, supra note 217, at 7, 36 ($1 million maximum fine for antitrust violations).
To deal with situations involving a multiplicity of punitive damages claims, other arbi-
trary control devices may be in order. As the total punitive damages assessed against the
company in different actions mount, there should come a point when the aggregate of such
punishment will be deemed sufficient as a matter of law. See In re Northern Dist. "Dalkon
Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (N.D. Cal. 1981), full op. issued,
No. 80-2213 (Nov. 5, 1981). As a guide for knowing when that point is reached, a court
might look to some arbitrary, aggregate cap-for instance, the lesser of $5 million or 5% of
net worth-after which it could limit such damages to the plaintiff's attorneys' fees and
other costs of litigation. See Owen, supra note 7, at 1325. Although the legislature is clearly
the preferable forum for determining the proper amounts for such general limits, the courts
may be forced to make such decisions due to the exigencies of this type of litigation if the
legislatures do not act. See note 247 infra.
H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), introduced by Rep. Norman D. Shumway (R.
Cal.), adopts several of the control approaches discussed above. Section 11 limits punitive
damages to the lesser of twice the plaintiff's compensatory damages or $1 million and sets
an aggregate cap at the lesser of $5 million or five percent of net worth, after which such
damages are limited to the lesser of attorney's fees or double compensatory damages.
Class action certification in appropriate cases might also help to avoid the risk of over-
punishment. See In re Northern Dist. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F.
Supp. 1188, 1192-94 (N.D. Cal. 1981), full op. issued, No. 80-2213 (Nov. 5, 1981). See also
text and note at note 249 infra. But cf. Coffee, Making Punishment Fit, supra note 217, at
28 (citing impracticalities of class actions in products cases).
221 After Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr.
482 (1979) (reversing $5 million punitive damages verdict for excessiveness), appeal dis-
missed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980), one might have expected such a result.
29 See text and note at note 209 supra.
"1* See text and note at note 61 supra.
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B. Increasing Judicial Control
Against this background of potential jury whim is a clear
trend by the courts to take firmer hold of matters relating to puni-
tive damages in products cases. In recognition of the array of
problems endemic to the use of punitive damages in this context,
some courts of late have begun to exert stricter control over the
process of determining such awards, from discovery safeguards
23 1
and pretrial rulings232 through remittitur 23 3 or reversal on ap-
peal.2 " Several courts that recently have approved for the first
time awards of punitive damages in products liability cases have
emphasized the importance of firm trial and appellate court con-
trol to reduce the added risks of abuse-particularly the threat of
over-punishment from multiple awards for a single product mis-
take.2 35 This development is of crucial importance,3 6 one that may
well be necessary to prevent such awards from violating a corpora-
tion's due process rights.23
1. Tightening the Legal Standards. I have discussed above
the importance of refining the definition of the standard of miscon-
duct in products liability cases and the usefulness of separating the
culpability issue into its various components for proof, argument,
and analysis.238 A similar breakdown of the considerations perti-
nent to the determination of the amount of such awards is at least
as important. Searching for a means to narrow and clarify the fo-
cus of inquiry in such litigation, at least two states by legislation,239
2I See text and notes at notes 252-260 infra.
222 See text and notes at notes 261-266 infra.
223 See text and notes at notes 271-273 infra.
234 See text and note at note 270 infra.
25 See Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615
P.2d 621, 624 (1980); American Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 113-15,
412 A.2d 407, 417-19 (1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655, 668-69 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 306-07, 294 N.W.2d 437, 461 (1980).
See also text and note at note 249 infra.
M See Mallor & Roberts, supra note 33, at 670 ("[T]he very power of the remedy
demands that judges exercise close control over the imposition and assessment of punitive
damages.").
2'7 Due process arguments have fared poorly in the products liability-punitive damages
context, however. See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 46 (Alaska 1979), on
rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 737, 811-12,
174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 383-84 (1981); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689,
716-17, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 417-18 (1967).
"I See text and notes at notes 93-125 supra.




several courts,24 ° and the Commerce Department in its Model Uni-
form Products Liability Act241 have adopted some version of the
list of factors I proposed in my earlier article24 2 to guide courts and
juries in deciding the amount of punitive liability to assess. 43 Al-
though consideration of these factors against the factual context of
a case cannot of course reduce the question of amount to mathe-
240 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 n.17 (Alaska 1979), on rehear-
ing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 305, 294 N.W.2d 437,
460 (1980).
See MUPLA, supra note 195, § 120(B), reprinted in 44 FED. REG. at 62,748.
242 The factors were outlined there as follows:
In summary, proper measurement of a punitive damages award in a products liability
case should be furthered by careful consideration of the following factors:
(1) the amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses;
(2) the seriousness of the hazard to the public;
(3) the profitability of the marketing misconduct (increased by an appropriate
multiple);
(4) the attitude and conduct of the enterprise upon discovery of the misconduct;
(5) the degree of the manufacturer's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness;
(6) the number and level of employees involved in causing or covering up the market-
ing misconduct;
(7) the duration of both the improper marketing behavior and its cover-up;
(8) the financial condition of the enterprise and the probable effect thereon of a partic-
ular judgment; and
(9) the total punishment the enterprise will probably receive from other sources.
Owen, supra note 7, at 1319.
242 One factor that apparently has influenced juries more than the courts is item (3),
the profitability of the marketing misconduct. One of the Grimshaw jurors interviewed after
the trial explained the jury's rationale in selecting $125 million as the amount for the puni-
tive award: "Mr. Greene ... recalls bringing up the $125 million figure himself. He rea-
soned that if Ford had saved $100 million by not installing safe tanks, an award matching
that wouldn't really be punitive. So he added $25 million." Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1978, at 12,
col. 2. See also Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 50 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615
P.2d 621, 626 (1980) (dissenting opinions), where the jury's punitive award of $2.9 million
was roughly the product of the number of revolvers sold (about 1.5 million) times the cost
per unit ($1.93) that would have been necessary "to cure the defect."
How the profitability of the misconduct should figure into the calculation of a punitive
damages award is an aspect of the broader question whether the defendant should be forced
to redress the totality of its wrong to the public in a single action and a single punitive
damages award. Implicitly, the Grirnshaw and Sturm, Ruger courts both thought not. A
federal court expressly addressing the question agreed:
To conclude that this particular victim may collect punitive damages on behalf of that
immeasurable group of Aralen consumers is folly .... In the final analysis,. . . the
computation of the punitive damages verdict, if any, must be a reasonable sum in rela-
tion to the defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff.
Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 850, 856 (M.D. Pa. 1974). This view probably is
correct in that it relates the punitive award to the plaintiff's injury consistent with tradi-
tional doctrine, reduces substantially the incentive to race to the courthouse, and anticipates
a multiplicity of similar actions that together will result in many smaller "stings" to the
manufacturer. See note 227 supra.
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matical precision, they serve at least to clarify the questions of why
the act was very wrong and what may be necessary to discourage
such behavior in the future.
2. Tightening Up on Procedural Control. a. Bifurcation. I
continue to believe that judges alone should determine at least the
amount of punitive awards in products cases,"4 as several com-
mentators245 and the Model Act248 have proposed. Ideally, as ap-
parently directed by statute in Connecticut,247 the trial should be
bifurcated to accomplish this result. Thus the jury would pass on
liability for compensatory damages and their amount and perhaps
on liability for a punitive award as well. If necessary, the trial
judge, sitting without a jury, would then hold a second hearing on
punitive damages alone. Under this bifurcated procedure, compli-
cated financial testimony that might prejudice the jury on the de-
fect question would be heard only by the trial judge. Also relevant
at this second stage of trial would be any additional evidence
presented by either party relevant to the aggravation or mitigation
of guilt or otherwise relevant at this stage only.
2 48
One such type of evidence relevant to amount, of crucial im-
portance in many "mass disaster" products liability cases, is the
"poverty" evidence a manufacturer, for obvious tactical reasons,
may be reluctant to introduce before a jury. If the manufacturer is
facing many lawsuits of a similar type, as in the Dalkon Shield
litigation, the total "punishment" it already has suffered and is
likely in the future to receive for the same misconduct (measured
by judgments and settlements for punitive-and perhaps compen-
satory-damages), substantially reduces the appropriate amount of
244 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1320. Similar to the sentencing of criminals, the determi-
nation of amount has aptly been described as a "quasi-judicial" function. See Prince v.
Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975) (libel and slander case).
245 See, e.g., DuBois, supra note 33, at 352-53; Fulton, supra note 33 at 130; Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 33, at 663-66.
24' See MUPLA, supra note 195, § 120(B), reprinted in 44 FED. REG. at 62,748.
247 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1981) ("If the trier of fact determines
that punitive damages should be awarded, the court shall determine the amount of such
damages not to exceed an amount equal to twice the damages awarded the plaintiff."). See
also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (West 1981) and OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(2) (1979), respectively
permitting and requiring the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case on punitive damages
liability prior to the admission of evidence on the defendant's financial condition.
248 See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 323, 294 N.W.2d 437, 468 (1980)
(Coffey, J., dissenting). Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 908 comment f ("Sometimes pro-
cedural techniques are utilized to prevent abuse of a claim for punitive damages when it
becomes apparent that they are not warranted and the claim was made for the purpose of
introducing prejudicial evidence that would otherwise not be admissible.").
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punishment in the case at bar.24"9 Other relevant yet sensitive evi-
dence that the manufacturer fairly might wish to avoid presenting
to the jury at the compensatory damages liability stage of the pro-
ceedings, such as cost-benefit studies,250 post-sale product improve-
ments, or the reliance by executives upon advice of counsel,2 51
could be heard at this time as well.
b. Pretrial showings and evidentiary rulings at trial. Al-
though apparently not all courts have the power to do so, 252 at
least one court has followed the approach authorized by statute in
California253 of requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing
of a manufacturer's liability for punitive damages before pretrial
discovery of wealth may proceed.2 5 Because considerable financial
data on publicly-held corporations is available to plaintiffs' counsel
in annual reports and 10-K reports filed with the SEC,2 55 this form
of pretrial protection usually will have little impact on the avail-
ability of such information. Where such information is sought
through discovery channels,2 56 however, the requirement will have
the salutary effect of forcing the punitive damages issue at an early
149 Roughly 1600 suits are presently pending against A.H. Robins Co., the manufacturer
of the Dalkon Shield. In re Northern Dist. "Dalkon Shield" Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp.
1188, 1193 (N.D.Cal. 1981), full op. issued, No. 80-2213 (Nov. 5, 1981). Compensatory dam-
ages claimed in these cases total more than $500 million, id. at 1191, and punitive damages
claimed total some $2,350,597,000, id. at 1193. The company's net worth is $280,394,000. Id.
at 1191. See text and notes at notes 227, 235 supra. See generally United School Dist. No.
490 v. Celotex Corp., 629 P.2d 196, 206 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981); Owen, supra note 7, at 1322-
25.
250 See text and notes at notes 264-266 infra.
251 On the "defense" of reliance on advice of counsel, see Rosener v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 754, 168 Cal. Rptr. 237, 245 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S.
1051 (1981); Levit, Punitive Damages: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 1980 INS. L.J. 257,
265.
:52 See Nichols v. Hoeke, 297 N.W.2d 205 (Iowa 1980).
's' See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(c) (West 1981).
' Leidholt v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 771 (Colo. 1980). See generally Note, Pre-
trial Discovery of Net Worth in Punitive Damages Cases, 54 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1141, 1148-49
(1981).
25 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.20, 249.310 (1981), implementing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Under section 229.20, a corporation registering with the Securities
and Exchange Commission is required annually to provide a description of its business, in-
cluding its current financial situation; a description of the physical property held by it; a list
of its directors and officers; a table showing all remunerations paid to directors and officers;
a description of any relevant legal proceedings to which it is a party;, a list of all persons
owning more than five percent of its securities; information as to the market prices paid for
its securities; a discussion of management of its finances and operations; and various other
information.
256 As might be necessary for very recent information on a publicly-held corporation
and for general financial information on a privately-held concern.
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stage.I Because a single punitive damages award can amount to mil-
lions of dollars, and because the likelihood of such assessments is
less predictable than compensatory damages awards, a prima facie
ruling on punitive damages at an early stage will help avoid the
unnecessary expenditure of considerable sums for the construction
of an elaborate punitive damages defense.2 5 Such a showing could
be postponed until shortly before the trial, when a plaintiff quite
easily could summarize his case on punitive damages at a special
hearing without tainting for the jury the main case on compensa-
tory damages. Because of the growing frequency of punitive dam-
age claims,258 and because such claims only infrequently are well
supported, 59 such a procedure should save time and expense and
also keep away from the jury inflammatory issues and arguments
that are unsupported by the evidence.260
257 See note 247 supra.
258 One judge has noted the "present-day practice of seeking punitive damages in sub-
stantially all damage actions, and what will reasonably be termed the explosion of punitive
damages awards." Rosener v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 740, 762, 168 Cal. Rptr.
237, 250 (1980) (Elkington, J., concurring) (emphasis in original), appeal dismissed, 450
U.S. 1051 (1981). A former president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America agrees:
"We almost always include a count for punitive damages." Cartwright, Products Liability:
Trial Strategy and Tactics, TRiAL, July 1980, at 38, 39. See also Levit, supra note 251, at
259 ("whereas 25 years ago, the punitive damages case was a rarity, today, it is an anomaly
when one sees a complaint which does not seek punitive damages") (emphasis in original).
Some plaintiffs' lawyers, however, urge restraint. See, e.g., Igoe, Punitive Damages in Prod-
ucts Liability Cases Should be Allowed, 22 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 24, 29 (1978); Kreindler, Pu-
nitive Damages in Aviation Litigation-An Essay, 8 CuM. L. REv. 607, 617 (1978).
Ford Motor Company's experience demonstrates this point. Prior to 1970, at most one
or two products liability lawsuits of the hundreds filed against Ford each year contained a
count for punitive damages, for a rate of less than 0.5% of all such complaints. By 1975, the
rate had risen to 5.4%, and in 1980 it had reached 27.1%. "In addition, to put the number
of punitive damages claims in perspective, literally hundreds of the cases we receive each
year involve minor property damage. Thus, the actual percentage of punitive damages
claims in personal injury cases would be in excess of [these] percentages ... " Eppel Let-
ter, supra note 156, at app.
259 This follows from the premise that only on rare occasions is the behavior of
manufacturers flagrantly improper, together with the finding that such claims are now very
common.
260 A summary judgment proceeding shortly before trial often could be used effectively
in many products cases to screen out punitive damages claims that are plainly devoid of
merit-as for example where the product's alleged defectiveness is itself seriously in doubt,
or where the defendant can convincingly demonstrate (by affidavit or otherwise) that the
claim of corporate "malice" rests principally upon statements in corporate documents that
are clearly being misconstrued by plaintiff's counsel. See text and notes at notes 78-88
supra.
Although summary judgment is normally inappropriate on matters involving a person's
state of mind, the normal preference for letting such issues go to the jury is offset at least to
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A defendant also should be permitted to make a pretrial argu-
ment, perhaps by motion in limine,61 to ask for the exclusion both
of inflammatory evidence that has little or no probative value and
of improper arguments that a plaintiff can be expected to put
before the jury. Because the punitive damages stakes are so large,
the plaintiff's counsel can be expected to tread as closely as possi-
ble to, and frequently over, the line of proper evidence and argu-
ment in the hope of winning a Grimshaw-type verdict.
2 2
Moreover, courts must take more seriously than usual their re-
sponsibility at trial to weigh the relevance of such evidence and
argument against any undue prejudice likely to be created;2 3 that
which appears to tip too heavily toward the latter must be ex-
cluded. It was on this ground that the trial court in Grimshaw ex-
cluded Ford's cost-benefit memorandum, analyzing a proposed
government standard for fuel tank integrity in roll-over situations,
that expressly balanced the costs of safety improvements against
some extent in "[c]ases involving malice" where "competing policy considerations" arise.
Because "actions that involve questions of malice often are disfavored torts," the "summary
adjudication of such claims may be thought of as a useful procedural tool and an effective
screening device for avoiding the unnecessary harrassment of defendant." 10 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 70, § 2370, at 590-92. Although defamation has been the usual con-
text where this principle has been applied, see Comment, The Propriety of Granting Sum-
mary Judgment for Defendants in Defamation Suits Involving Actual Malice, 26 VILL. L.
Rav. 470 (1980-81), punitive damages claims against manufacturers appear increasingly to
call for careful pretrial scrutiny of just this type. Punitive damages rest of course on "mal-
ice" and are often said to be "not favored by the law," and for the many reasons discussed
throughout this article there is an increasing cry for subjecting this disfavored "remedy" to
especially strict judicial control in products liability actions. See Moore v. Remington Arms
Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1114, 427 N.E.2d 608, 617 (1981); see also text and notes at notes
231-237 supra. It thus appears that courts would be well advised in products cases to con-
sider using the summary judgment proceeding on the punitive damages issue as an opportu-
nity to remove what is usually a spurious and emotion-laden issue from the case before trial
so that all may look forward to a fair adjudication of those issues that are properly in the
case.
261 See Craven v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 1165, 1171-72 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1981) (evidence of prior "similar" accidents properly excluded upon motion in limine;
no punitive damage issue). See generally Commentary, The Motion in Limine: Pretrial
Trump Card in Civil Litigation, 27 U. FLA. L. REv. 531 (1975).
"" See Note, Punitive Damages-Justifications, Criticisms and Limitations, 30 DEF.
L.J. 189, 204 (1981).
143 Cf. Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1980) (certain
evidence should have been excluded in products liability case under FED. R. EVID. 403 be-
cause its probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and confusion).
Courts in punitive damages cases should also take an especially hard look at the alleged
similarity of other accidents from the same product. Cf. McKinnon v. Skil Corp., 638 F.2d
270, 277 (1st Cir. 1981) (trial court's exclusion of prior accident evidence proper in non-
punitive damages case). See text and note at note 132 supra.
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the benefits in deaths and injuries avoided.28 Although this type of
analysis by Ford actually was applauded by the Department of
Transportation as a helpful step in design safety decision mak-
ing,265 the memo was seized upon by the press as proof of Ford's
callous disregard for human life.2 6
c. Judgment on the merits. Many trial courts generally are
reluctant to exercise their powers to grant summary judgment, di-
rected verdicts, judgments notwithstanding verdicts, and new
trials; such powers, being in derogation of the judgment of the
jury, are properly exercised only with studied care. 67 Yet the risks
of an erroneous jury award of punitive damages in a products lia-
bility case are so great, as is the probability that the error will con-
taminate the entire case, that trial courts should give especially
284 This was the so-called Grush-Saunby Report referred to by the court of appeal in
Grimshaw. See 119 Cal. App. 3d at 800, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 376. The key cost-benefit calcula-
tions appeared in Table 3 of the report:
BENEFITS AND COSTS RELATING TO FUEL LEAKAGE ASSOCIATED WITH
THE STATIC ROLLOVER TEST PORTION OF FMVSS 208
BENEFITS:
Savings: 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, 2100 burned vehicles.
Unit Cost: $200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury, $700 per vehicle.
Total
Benefit: 180 x ($200,000) + 180 x ($67,000) + 2100 x ($700) = $49.5 million.
COSTS:
Sales: 11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks.
Unit Cost: $11 per car, $11 per truck.
Total Cost: 11,000,000 x ($11) + 1,500,000 x ($11) = $137 million.
The table is reproduced and discussed in W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 490-91. See also
Dowie, supra note 2, at 24.
288 Interview with John P. Eppel, supra note 156. The dollar estimates for fatalities and
injuries used in the analysis were in fact based upon NHTSA's own cost calculations. See
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, SOCIETAL COSTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE AccmENTs: PRELIMINARY
REPORT 1-5 (1972); Eppel Letter, supra note 156.
26 CBS News Correspondent Mike Wallace referred to this report in an interview with
Ford's Vice President of Environmental and Safety Engineering- "I find it difficult to be-
lieve that top management of the Ford Motor Company is going to sit there and say, 'Oh,
we'll buy 2,000 deaths, 10,000 injuries, because we want to make some money or we want to
bring in a cheaper car?"' "Is Your Car Safe?," 60 MINUTES, vol. 10, no. 40, at 7 (June 11,
1978), cited in W. KEETON, supra note 49, at 491. See also note 119 supra.
Another Ford memo containing some cost-benefit analysis did get to the jury. Its rele-
vance to the case was apparently more clear, but it was nevertheless highly prejudicial to
Ford. See note 80 supra.
287 See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 473, 493 (3d ed. 1976).
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careful consideration to motions of this type. The judge should
make every effort to cut through the morass of proof, the seman-
tics of the rules of liability, and the rhetoric of counsel to pass
judgment at the earliest possible time on whether a fair case really
has been made that the manufacturer's conduct was flagrant. If
such a fair case has not been made-if, for example, the manufac-
turer's design choice should instead be placed in the large, gray
realm of "close calls" short of moral reprehensibility (as usually
will be the case)-the court should relieve the jury of the tempta-
tion to base its decision on passion and prejudice, or it should cor-
rect the error if the jury in its verdict succumbed to such emotions.
In recent years a number of trial courts thus have directed ver-
dicts28 and rendered judgments notwithstanding the verdict26 9 on
punitive damages claims in products liability cases.
Appellate courts also should subject such awards in products
cases to closer scrutiny and reverse them when not supported by
the record.70 Scrupulous appellate review is especially important
268 See, e.g., Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (directed
verdict on the issue of punitive damages affirmed); Turney v. Ford Motor Co., 94 Ill. App.
3d 678, 686, 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1085 (1981) (affirming trial court's decision to strike punitive
damages count at end of plaintiff's case). See also Wagner v. International Harvester Co.,
611 F.2d 224, 233 (8th Cir. 1979) (district court's denial of plaintiff's motion to amend com-
plaint to include punitive damages issue was proper, and appeal of issue was deemed "to
border on the frivolous"); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 298, 294 N.W.2d 437,
457 (1980) (interlocutory appeal) ("Unless there is evidence from which a jury could find
that the wrongdoer's conduct was 'outrageous,' the trial court should not submit the issue of
punitive damages to the jury."). But see American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 468
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that trial court's directed verdict for manufacturer on
punitive damages was in error). The court's acknowledgment that "there was abundant evi-
dence adduced at trial below that AMC simply made a valid business decision to retain the
rear-end fuel tank location," id., casts a serious shadow of doubt over the propriety of its
ruling.
" The trial court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the jury's $10 million ver-
dict in Maxey is the most striking example of this approach. Maxey v. Freightliner Corp.,
450 F. Supp. 955, 964 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc
granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 616
F.2d 734, 738 (5th Cir. 1980) ($60,000); McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, Inc., 575 F.2d 155,
160 (8th Cir.) ($45,000), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Thomas v. American Cystoscope
Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ($200,000); Newding v. Kroger Co., 554
S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) ($60,000, combined). But cf. Dorsey v. Honda Motor
Co., 655 F.2d 650, 655 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing district court's judgment notwithstanding
the verdict of jury's $5 million punitive damages verdict).
270 Several appellate courts have done so. See, e.g., Johnson v. Husky Indus., Inc., 536
F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Forrest City Mach. Works, Inc. v. Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616
S.W.2d 720 (1981); Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Moore v. Remington Arms Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 427 N.E.2d 608 (1981); Harley-David-
son Motor Co. v. Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700, 704-05 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); American
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because it is a defendant's last hope for reason and calm reflection
before the judgment takes effect. On the appeal of such awards,
the trial record must be scrutinized with special care for improper
evidence, for argument that might have inflamed the jury, and for
the sufficiency of the evidence on the whole.
d. Remittiturs. Grimshaw is the largest remittitur of a puni-
tive damages verdict in the history of punitive damages litigation
in this context-from $125 million to $3.5 million, a reduction of
97.2 %.271 Other courts, both trial and appellate, also have used re-
mittitur to cure excessive punitive verdicts in products cases.272
Remittitur may too easily be used improperly as a compromise,
however, when an excessive verdict was produced by passion or
prejudice and thus should instead be stricken altogether, some-
times along with the verdict for compensatory damages as well.273
e. Standard of proof. A number of commentators have pro-
posed that punitive damages, serving as they do as quasi-criminal
penalties, should be established by a higher standard of proof than
by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard.274 Colorado
requires that punitive damages be established by proof beyond a
reasonable doubt,27 5 and the "clear and convincing" evidentiary
standard has been adopted by statute in Oregon 276 and Minne-
sota,277 by judicial opinion in Wisconsin,2 7 8 and by the Model
Laundry Mach. Indus. v. Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980).
271 Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-77-61 (Super. Ct., Orange Cty., Cal., Mar. 30,
1978) (mem. order), aff'd, 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981).
272 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (reducing $2.9 mil-
lion verdict to $250,000 permissible maximum on retrial), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980)
(approving entry of $500,000 punitive award); Stambaugh v. International Harvester Co.,
No. 76-L-2775 (Cir. Ct., St. Clair Cty., Ill., Oct. 26, 1979) (remitting $15 million verdict to
$7.5 million, Mar. 10, 1980). The court of appeal in Grimshaw discussed the standards of
review on remittitur for both the trial and appellate courts at 119 Cal. App. 3d at 823-24,
174 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91.
217 See Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("There is
a temptation to avoid a direct confrontation with the sufficiency of evidence of defendant's
intent by reducing the award. Such an approach misapprehends the court's and jury's
role."), af'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir.
1980).
274 See Owen, supra note 2, at 226 ("It seems both fair and logical to require that the
imposition of quasi-criminal punishment, standing halfway between the civil and the crimi-
nal law, be supported by a standard of proof halfway between the civil law's 'preponderance
of the evidence' and the criminal law's 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' "); MUPLA,
supra note 195, § 120(A), reprinted in 44 FED. REG. at 62,748-49. See also Comment, supra
note 37, at 417-18.
276 COLo. RE V. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1973).
"' OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925(1) (1979).-
277 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West Supp. 1981).
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Act.279 The "clear and convincing" standard's usefulness in resolv-
ing "close call" questions on design liability has recently been
noted by the Twerski group 280 and by Professor Henderson.2 1 The
standard helps to check the risks faced by manufacturers making
daily good faith engineering decisions, and it reminds the court
and jury at every step to blow away the smoke and dust of the
litigation battle to see if the stuff of truly flagrant conduct is really
there.
CONCLUSION
My conclusion in 1976 was that punitive damages awards
should be permitted in appropriate products liability cases.28 2 Af-
ter the judicial experience of 'the ensuing years, I remain convinced
of the need to retain this tool of legal control over corporate
abuses-a conclusion reinforced by the current Administration's
move to restrict the regulation of product safety by the Consumer
Product Safety Commission.8 3
Yet the experience of the past several years has raised ques-
tions whether the punitive damages doctrine is being abused in
products cases, whether some manufacturers are being punished
who should not be, and whether penalties, though appropriately
assessed, are sometimes unfairly large. One can do little more than
speculate about the appropriateness of any particular award in
most of the cases. In Grimshaw, for example, although the appel-
late opinion as written may appear to make a fair case for some
award of punitive damages, one is left with nagging doubts con-
cerning some of its key conclusions, such as the feasibility of at
least some of the alternative design "fixes" Ford considered and
278 Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 299-300, 294 N.W.2d 437, 457-58 (1980).
Although not formally adopting the standard, two other courts have noted the importance
in such cases of requiring strict proof. See Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d
832, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1967); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955, 963 (N.D. Tex.
1978) ("Demanding strict proof will reduce the hazard of deterrence slipping into destruc-
tion to those cases of conduct so egregious as to have little equitable appeal."), aff'd, 623
F.2d 395 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. 1980).
179 MUPLA, supra note 195, § 120(A), reprinted in 44 FED. REG. at 62,748.
290 Twerski, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 50, at 375.
181 Henderson, Process Defense, supra note 50.
181 See Owen, supra note 7, at 1371.
1 The 1982 Budget for the Commission was reduced by thirty percent in the first
round of Reagan Administration budget cuts and is slated for further cuts in the future. 9
PROD. SvETY & LIAn. REP. 740-41 (1981).
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rejected "reprehensibly. '28 4 Even more disconcerting is the absence
of any real explanation of why $3.5 million-rather than $500,000,
$20 million, or the jury's $125 million figure-was an appropriate
amount for the award. Most judicial opinions passing on such
awards are considerably weaker even than Grimshaw in failing to
explain their rationales.288
Because much in both resources and principle is at stake in
cases of quasi-criminal punishment against manufacturers, they
and the public generally are entitled to much fuller explanation by
the courts of why punitive awards should stand or fall. Once the
courts and commentators fight through the emotion and maze of
words that tend to dominate such cases, we may expect to see a
healthy clarification of legal principles begin to emerge. And even
if we probably can never find a set of rules that are precise and
clear, detailed explanations of judicial results in such cases will
give better insight into the true nature of a manufacturer's respon-
sibilities to the public.
25 See 119 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
5 See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981).
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